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Immigration has social, political, economic, and security significance in Sri 
Lanka. Immigrants bring economic potential to the countries receiving them but also pose 
many security threats that may include criminal, terrorist, and extremist activities, as well 
as ethnic tensions and sectarian violence. This study identifies some of the potential 
threats posed by immigration, both legal and illegal, and examines the underdeveloped 
framework of Sri Lankan immigration law. A comparative analysis of Sri Lanka, its 
neighbor India, and the island nation of Bahamas serves to identify possible measures for 
revising the existing counterterrorism approaches and introducing new strategies to Sri 
Lanka. Furthermore, an analysis of these countries demonstrates that reform of 
comprehensive policies, the practice of immigration control, and effectively coordinated 
counterterrorism strategies to monitor immigrants may enhance the national security of 
Sri Lanka.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since Sri Lanka’s civil war ended in 2009, the peace and stability of the nation 
has attracted migrants with varying aspirations and agendas. Tourists are the main 
category of temporary immigrants; in 2015, 1.7 million visitors came to Sri Lanka.1 
Tourism accounted for 11.1 percent of Sri Lanka’s gross domestic product in 2015, and 
the trend is increasing.2 Apart from tourists, legal immigrants to the country include 
Tamil returnees, job seekers with visas, and temporary business immigrants.  
Other migrants, who have illegally entered the country, use Sri Lanka as a hub for 
crime or espionage or as a stopover on the way to places like Australia and Western 
Europe. Sri Lanka is an island nation, but it is by no means immune to the forces of 
migration or the potential threats that come with it: the possible re-emergence of 
terrorism, the advent of extremist groups, the rekindling of ethnic divisions and sectarian 
violence, organized crime, and smuggling. Sri Lanka’s national security strategy does not 
directly address migration, however—despite the gravity of these potential threats.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
How does migration affect national security in Sri Lanka? This thesis explores the 
security implications of migration—legal and illegal—to Sri Lanka, in part by examining 
the migration experiences, policies, and practices of other states in South Asia and other 
island nations around the world. The hope is to identify immigration policies and 
counterterrorism measures that Sri Lanka can put into action today—before migration 
becomes a national security problem. 
                                                 
1 “Nearly 1.8 Million Tourists Visit Sri Lanka in 2015,” Ministry of Defence Sri Lanka, accessed 
November 16, 2016,  
http://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Nearly_18_million_tourists_visit_Sri_Lanka_in_20150105_02.  
2 World Travel and Tourism Council, Travel & Tourism: Economic Impact 2015, Sri Lanka (London, 
UK: Author, 2015), 3, https://www.wttc.org/-
/media/files/reports/economic%20impact%20research/countries%202015/srilanka2015.pdf.  
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B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Human migration has taken place throughout history. At times, it has been 
considered an opportunity by the receiving countries, but more often, migration is viewed 
as a threat.3 Certainly today, migration seems to threaten the social and political stability 
of the world’s established democracies, notably in Europe amid the continuing influx of 
refugees from the war in Syria and economic migrants from Africa, but also, in the light 
of rhetoric of the 2016 presidential campaign, in the United States of America.4  
The threat is neither abstract nor rhetorical, however. For example, the 
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks triggered new reforms and inspired the impetus to 
streamline the existing immigration system. As Mittelstadt et al. describe, “the post-9/11 
era marked the birth of a new generation of interoperable databases that sit at the 
crossroads of intelligence and law enforcement, reshaping immigration enforcement at 
the federal, state, and local levels through increased information collection and sharing.”5 
European countries, on the other hand, after major terrorist attacks have adopted 
immigration policies like securitization and marketization to protect citizens and 
immigrants from terrorists by closing the gate to terrorism and opening the gate to 
immigration for laborers.6  
                                                 
3 Jef Huysmans, “The European Union and the Securitization of Migration,” Journal of Common 
Market Studies 38, no. 5 (December 2000): 752, 
http://88.255.97.25/reserve/resfall12_13/intl551_AIcduygu/week9.PDF. See also Jack A. Goldstone, 
“Population and Security: How Demographic Change Can Lead to Violent Conflict,” Journal of 
International Affairs 56, no. 1 (Fall 2002): 3–21, http://www.jstor.org/stable/24357881. For details on the 
American perspective of immigrants after terrorist attack in Brussels, see Nate Silver, “Past Terrorist 
Attacks Helped Trump Capitalize on Anti-Muslim Sentiment,” FiveThirtyEight, March 22, 2016, 
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/past-terrorist-attacks-helped-trump-capitalize-on-anti-muslim-sentiment/. 
For details on the American public’s opinion about immigration, see Frank Newport, “American Public 
Opinion and Immigration,” GALLUP, July 20, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/opinion/polling-
matters/184262/american-public-opinion-immigration.aspx.  
4 Michelle Mittelstadt et al., Through the Prism of National Security: Major Immigration Policy and 
Program Changes in the Decade since 9/11 (Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute, 2011), 1, 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/post-9-11-immigration-policy-program-changes. 
5 Mittelstadt et al., “Through the Prism of National Security,” 1.  
6 Myron Weiner, “Security, Stability and International Migration,” Internal Security 17, no. 3 (Winter 
1992–1993): 91–126, http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2539131.pdf.  
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Today, Sri Lanka enjoys the full benefits of peace and is concentrating on 
economic development to bring prosperity to the country and its citizens. At the same 
time, the country must accelerate efforts to address the residual effects of its decades-long 
battle against the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE). Sri Lanka suffered heavy 
economic devastation and lost countless opportunities for growth during the war. Tourists 
did not visit the country, and foreign investments declined drastically.  
Even as the war was winding down, Sri Lanka experienced a three-fold increase 
in immigrants between 2006 and 2010. Community riots reduced the numbers between 
2008 and 2009, but with rapid globalization and an increase in tourism, the numbers have 
increased drastically since 2010 (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1.  The Arrival of Immigrants from 2006 to 2015.7 
Furthermore, tourist arrivals increased by roughly 19 precent (209,351) between 
June 2015 and June 2016.8 The average number of tourist arrivals per year was 422,110 
                                                 
7Source: “Sri Lanka Tourist Arrivals,” Trading Economics, http://www.tradingeconomics.com/sri-
lanka/tourist-arrivals. 
8 “Sri Lanka Tourist Arrivals up 19.1-Pct in July 2016,” Economy Next, August 5, 2016, 
http://www.economynext.com/Sri_Lanka_tourist_arrivals_up_19.1_pct_in_July_2016-3-5791.html.  
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between 1970 and 2015.9 Figure 2 illustrates 2012 arrivals by purpose of entry into Sri 
Lanka.  
 
Figure 2.  Purpose of the Entry to Sri Lanka in 2012.10  
Visiting friends and relatives was the most common reason for entry at 23.2 percent 
(606,581). This category was followed by short-term arrivals at 16.2 percent (423,756). 
Next came holiday visits, which contributed 14.1 percent (367,427), while 5.7 percent 
(149,158) visited for business purposes, and 10.4 percent (272,057) were non-citizen 
(returning) residents.11  
It is important to consider the composition of immigrants throughout the country. 
Indians, Chinese, and Maldivians make up the majority of immigrants. Pakistani 
nationals and some other South Asian immigrants represent another portion of the 
immigrant population. Immigrants from Nigeria and other African nations were seen in 
                                                 
9 “Sri Lanka Tourist Arrivals,” Trading Economics. 
10 Source: “Tourist Statistic Annual Report 2012,” Statistics Botswana, 
http://www.cso.gov.bw/images/tourism2012.pdf. 
11 Ibid.  
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lower numbers.12 The number of Chinese immigrants increased rapidly in Sri Lanka after 
the end of the war. The total Chinese immigrant population in Sri Lanka has not yet been 
calculated reliably, but it has been acknowledged that the increase is significant.13 The 
descendants of early migrants are fewer, but the working community is much greater in 
number.14 According to Sri Lanka's Department of Immigration and Emigration, as of 
2010, “a total of 7,844 Chinese workers resided on employment visas, typically of one 
year validity in Sri Lanka.”15  
The migration profile of Sri Lanka points to a rapid increase in Maldivian, 
Chinese, and Indian immigrants in recent years.16 The main reasons for this migration 
include education, employment, and business.17 Also, more than 1,000 Maldivians in the 
country have temporary visas at any given time.18 This number consists of holiday-
making tourists, patients for medical purposes, and visitors to family members who live 
in the country. Other than the Chinese and Maldivian populations, a considerable number 
of Indians are also living in Sri Lanka.19 Given the enduring relationship and the 
geographical proximity of the countries, many Indians have immigrated to Sri Lanka for 
such purposes as business, agriculture, and education. These Indian immigrants are 
mainly concentrated in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka but also occupy the 
capital of the country.  
                                                 
12 “Sri Lanka Tourist Arrivals,” Trading Economics. 
13 Quintus Perera, “Chinese Labour Work Three Times Harder than Sri Lankan Counterparts,” 
Business Times, October 23, 2011, http://www.sundaytimes.lk/111023/BusinessTimes/bt027.html.  
14 Ibid. 
15 “Sri Lanka Tourist Arrivals,” Trading Economics.   
16 Ministry of Foreign Employment Promotion and Welfare, Migration Profile: Sri Lanka (Colombo, 
Sri Lanka: Institute of Policy Studies of Sri Lanka, 2013), 6–9,  
http://www.ips.lk/ips_migration/publication/migration_profile/migration_profile_ips.pdf.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Kumar Moses, “Allow Maldivians to Settle in Sri Lanka If Rising Sea Levels Threaten the Atoll,” 
Lankaweb, April 12, 2011, http://www.lankaweb.com/news/items/2011/04/12/allow-maldivians-to-settle-
in-sri-lanka-if-rising-sea-levels-threaten-the-atoll/. 
19 “Number of Maldivians Visiting Sri Lanka Down 14 Percent in April,” vNews, May 11, 2015, 
http://www.vnews.mv/43901. 
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As Tom Miles and Shihar Aneez point out, during the recent past, many Pakistani 
and Afghan nationals were deported with the assistance of the Embassy of Pakistan while 
occupying as asylum seekers the Putlam and Nigambo areas.20 Apart from these groups, 
small numbers of laborers from Myanmar, Nigerians for trade, and a few Europeans were 
also seen. These nationals have been staying in the country as tourist and work-visa 
holders or as undocumented immigrants.21 Additionally, according to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations (UN) refugee agency, 
“205 Pakistani, Afghan and Iranian refugees and asylum seekers remain in detention in 
Sri Lanka.”22 As such, the UNHCR guidelines for the government and policy makers of 
Sri Lanka suggest identifying eligibility of asylum claims of Muslims and Christian 
communities from Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran.23  
The civil war that started in 1983 caused many Tamils to migrate to Western 
countries. According to the available statistics, approximately 800,000 Sri Lankan Tamil 
expatriates fled to Western countries during the war for their survival.24 Approximately 
620,000 Tamils fled to the United States, Canada, Australia, and other European 
countries, while approximately 180,000 took residence in Scandinavian counties and 
India.25 As Sulakshani Perera explains, “There were some 140,000 Sri Lankan refugees 
in 65 countries, with a majority 70,000 in 112 refugee camps and other 32,000 living 
outside camps in Tamil Nadu.”26 Many Tamils who have been living in Western 
                                                 
20 Tom Miles and Shihar Aneez, “UN Says Sri Lanka Illegally Returning Pakistani Asylum Seekers,” 
Reuters, August 2, 2014, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sri-lanka-refugees-
idUSKBN0G20JX20140802.  
21 Ibid. 
22 Bella Dalima, “UNHCR Urges Sri Lanka to Stop Deporting Pakistani Asylum Seekers,” News First, 
August 6, 2014, http://newsfirst.lk/english/2014/08/unhcr-urges-lankan-authorities-stop-deportations-
asylum-seekers/48223.   
23 UN News Centre, “UN Refugee Agency Alarmed as Sri Lanka Deports Families Seeking Asylum,” 
August 12, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=48470#.V4B9Lldll-U.  
24 Dhananjayan Sriskandarajan, “Tamil Diaspora Politics and Identity,” Springerlink, June 14, 2004, 
494, http://www.sangam.org/taraki/articles/2006/02-09_Diaspora_Tamil_Politics.pdf.  
25 Ibid.  
26 Sulakshani Perera, “UNHCR Helps First Group of Sri Lankan Refugees Return by Ferry from 
India,” UNHCR: The UN Refugee Agency, October 12, 2011, http://www.unhcr.org/en-
us/news/latest/2011/10/4e959c759/unhcr-helps-first-group-sri-lankan-refugees-return-ferry-india.html.   
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countries are in the process of returning to Sri Lanka to resettle, visit, or to claim their 
abandoned lands.27  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review seeks to develop a contextual understanding of migration 
and its effects on national security. It also identifies migration patterns, causes, effects as 
well as migration-related threats and measures to overcome them. Specifically, this 
section examines the relevant migration theories and counterterrorism strategies while 
taking into account the dynamic nature of the present threats.  
1. Causes of Migration 
From the very beginning of human civilization, human migration has been 
“influencing the place of origin and the place of destination.”28 The migration process has 
attracted the attention of social scientists, but most of the discussions are related to rural-
urban migration and its consequences.29 Typically, the literature concerns economic and 
social causes of migration.30 For example, according to Zachariah, Mathew and Rajan; 
Bartram, and Weinstein, economic factors are predominant for urban and rural 
                                                 
27 Perera, “UNHCR Helps First Group of Sri Lankan Refugees Return by Ferry from India.” 
28 Patrick Manning and Tiffany Trimmer, Migration in World History, 2nd edition, (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 5–8, https://books.google.com/. 
29 Douglas S. Massey et al., “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal,” 
Population and Development Review 19, no. 3 (1993): 431–66, doi: 10.2307/2938462. 
30 Rudolf Winter-Ebmer, “Motivation for Migration and Economic Success,” Journal of Economic 
Psychology 15, no. 2 (June 1994): 269–284, doi: 10.1016/0167-4870(94)90004-3; Ros Garnaut, Rana 
Ganguly, and Jongsoon Kang, Migration to Australia and Comparison with the United States: Who 
Benefits? (Canberra, Australia: Australian National University, May 2003), 3–7, 
http://zanran_storage.s3.amazonaws.com/www.immi.gov.au/ContentPages/1579436.pdf; G. F. De Jong and 
J. T. Fawcett, “Motivation for Migration: An Assessment and a Value-expectancy Research Model,” 
Popline (New York, Pergamum: 1981),13–58, http://www.popline.org/node/388494; Sara R. Curran and 
Abigali C. Saguy, “Migration and Cultural Change: A Role for Gender and Social Networks?” Journal of 
International Woman’s Studies 2 No. 3 (2001): 54–77, 
http://vc.bridgew.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1619&context=jiws. 
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migration.31 Mitchel J. Clyde details the causes of migration and highlights how factors 
like employment, better business opportunities, and better living conditions are self-
motivating factors for migration.32 Conversely, Douglas S. Massey et al. explore how 
social factors affect the tendency to migrate.33 They posit that underlying these factors 
are demographic influences, such as sex, family size, family conflict, family structures, 
and marriage, as well as the social factors outside villages such urban educational 
prospects and opportunities for pleasure.34  
Apart from the economic and social factors, political factors also constitute 
reasons for migration. Susanne Schmeidl points out that people move “from time to time, 
and from place to place” as refugees, political asylum-seekers, or displaced persons 
because of internal disputes, foreign military intervention, or other political or natural 
calamities.35 David Keane argues that people move for environmental reasons such as 
climate and other natural calamities.36  
Social scientists have also expressed views about the trend of push and pull or 
rural push to urban pull in migration. This phenomenon is significant simply because it 
                                                 
31 “Kerala is dependent on migration for employment, subsistence, housing, household amenities, 
institution building, and many other developmental activities.” K. C. Zachariah, E. T. Mathew, and S. 
Irudaya Rajan, “Social, Economic, and Demographic Consequences of Migration on Kerala,” International 
Migration 39. no. 2 (June 2001): 43–71, doi: 10.1111/1468-2435.00149; David V. Bartram, “Foreign 
Workers in Israel: History and Theory,” International Migration Review 32, no. 2 (Summer 1998): 303–
325, doi: 10.2307/2547185; David Bartram, “Economic Migration and Happiness: Comparing immigrants 
and Natives’ Happiness Gains from Income,” Social Indicators Research 103, no. 1 (August 2011): 57–76, 
doi: 10.1007/s 010-9696-2; and Eric Weinstein, “Migration for the Benefit of All: Towards a new Paradigm 
for Economic Immigration” International Labor Review 141, no. 3 (June 2002): 225–252, doi: 
10.1111/J.164-913X.2002.tb00238.x. 
32 Mitchel J. Clyde, “The Causes of Labor Migration,” Bulletin of the Inter African Labor Institute 6, 
no. 1 (1959):12–47.  
33 Douglas S. Massey et al., “Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal.”; Biplab 
Dasgupta and Roy Laishley, “Migration from Villages,” Economic and Political Weekly 10, no. 42 
(October 1975): 1652–1662, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40738301.pdf.  
34 Dasgupta and Laishley, “Migration from Villages,” 1652–1660. 
35 Susanne Schmeidl, “Exploring the Causes of Force Migration: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 
1970–1990,” Social Science Quarterly 78, no. 2 (June 1997): 284–308, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/42864338?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents. 
36 David Keane, “Environment Causes and Consequences of Migration: A Search for the Meaning of 





provides the necessary theoretical background to understand the similarity of what other 
scholars have discussed. Therefore, to understand the theoretical perspective and causes 
of migration, Lee’s push-pull theory is considered best because it describes the causes 
and pattern of migration.  
2. Sociological Theory (Push-Pull) 
Osvaldo Muniz, Wei Li, and Yvonne Schleicher highlight Lee’s push-pull theory 
to explain the irregular pattern of migrants. According to Lee’s theory, in the migration 
context, the push-pull factors are significant.37 Pull factors are widely relevant in 
explaining national as well as international movements of migrants. Muniz, Li, and 
Schleicher define the concept as follows: “Push factors are negative factors at the place of 
origin, while pull factors are positive ones at the place of destination.”38 In addition, Lee 
suggests that the “decision to migrate and the process of migrating are influenced by the 
factors associated with area of origin, destination, intervening factors, personal factors 
and fluctuations in the economy” (see Figure 3).39  
                                                 
37 Osvaldo Muniz, Wei Li, and Yvonne Schleicher, “Conceptual Framework: Why Do People Move to 
Work in Another Place or Country?” AAG Centre for Global Geography Education, 
http://cgge.aag.org/Migration1e/ConceptualFramework_Jan10/ConceptualFramework_Jan10_print.html.  
38 Muniz, Li, and Schleicher, “Conceptual Framework.”  
39 Jessica Hagan-Zanker, “Why Do People Migrate? A Review of the Theoretical Literature” 




Figure 3.  Framework of Push-Pull Theory.40 
Figure 3 summarizes Lee’s push-pull theory in graphic form.41 According to 
Muniz, Li, and Schleicher, “It shows a possible migration between a place of origin and a 
place of destination, with positive and negative feedback considering Push-Pull 
factors.”42 Although flows originate from two places, obstacles potentially intervene 
during the movements.43 These obstacles are indicated by “mountains” that need not be a 
physical barrier. For example, immigration policies and laws of the receiving country can 
restrict the flow of immigrants and become formidable barriers to them.44 As such, 
migrants should consider both the origin and the destination of push-pulls, the “positives 
of staying and the negatives of moving” from one place to another.45 Migration push-pull 
theory leads to different rationales. For example, if economic advantages are greater in 
the country of destination than the country of origin, the chances of people migrating to 
such countries increases dramatically.46 Many scholars have described a number of 
                                                 








factors in different ways, but the most obvious causes that need discussion are economic, 
social, demography, and political factors.  
3. The Nexus of Security and Migration 
Weiner notes that today’s migrants take part in the economic, social, and political 
activities in receiving states but also in the place of origin.47 Different types of 
immigrants have different influences on the national security of receiving countries. As 
Huysmans describes, migration is not always linked to threat; to the contrary, migration 
often contributes to production and development of commerce.48 The transformation of 
security took place when the capitalist market turned into a global market system,49 thus 
linking illegal immigrants and securitization in a way that questioned migration and 
refugee systems.50 Tom Tancredo suggests, “Immigration levels pose different 
questions,” perhaps resulting in a clash of cultures of non-assimilated groups with 
loyalties, such as political allegiance or dual citizenship, which subsequently affect 
national security.51 Therefore, he suggests that those non-assimilated groups be treated as 
illegal immigrants according to a nation’s laws and policies.52  
In the same way, Weiner identifies five broad categories to classify immigration 
as a threat to national security: first, when migrants and refugees are rejected by their 
home regime; second, when the host country perceives security risks and political threats 
because of the immigrants and the refugees; third, “when immigrants are seen as a 
cultural threat or,”53 fourth, when immigrants and refugees “as a social and economic 
                                                 
47 Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” 103–105. 
48 Huysmans, “Securitization of Migration,” 757–759.  
49 Ibid. 
50 Maggie Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration: A Racial Discourse,” International Migration 
43, no. 5 (November 2005): 169, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
2435.2005.00345.x/pdf. 
51 Thomas G. Tancredo, “Immigration, Citizenship, and National Security: The Silent Invasion,” 
Mediterranean Quarterly 15, no. 4 (Fall 2004): 4–15, http://muse.jhu.edu/article/176902.  
52 Ibid., 6–8. 
53 Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” 105–106.  
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problem for the host society,” and fifth, “when the host society uses immigrants as an 
instrument of threat against the country of origin”54  
Some scholars have linked migration to security long ago and derived conclusions 
that “immigrants and refugees pose a threat.”55 Most importantly, Maggie Ibrahim notes, 
“In uncovering how migration has become a security issue, it is instructive to highlight 
how cultural differences, as a system classification, are associated with threat.”56 In other 
words, Ibrahim believes that immigrants who come with different cultures and identities 
threaten the normal life of the receiving state.57 As such, “negative belief” and 
“discriminatory action will lead to ethnic conflict, which ultimately changes the unity of 
the state.”58  
This issue not only affects the state culture but also leads to terrorism, 
insurgencies, and other criminal activities.59 A classic example is Chinese immigration to 
Canada. Despite the significant cultural difference, Chinese immigrants created a “Link 
between the illegal immigrants and security, that Canada’s immigration and refugee 
system were called to question.”60 In other words, Chinese immigration created a new 
approach for Canada to analyze the criminology perspective of immigration.61  
                                                 
54 Weiner, “Security, Stability, and International Migration,” 105–106. 
55 Victoria M. Esses, John F. Dovidio, and Gordon Hodson, “Public Attitudes toward Immigration in 
the United States and Canada in Response to the September 11, 2001 ‘Attack on America,’” Analyses of 
Social Issues and Public Policy 2, no. 1 (2002): 69–85, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1530-
2415.2002.00028.x/epdf; Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration.” See also Helen Crowley and Marry J. 
Hickman, “Migration, Post-Industrialism and the Globalized Nation State: Social Capital and Social 
Cohesion Re-examined,” Ethnic and Racial Studies 31, no. 7 (October 2008): 1222–1244, doi: 
10.1080/01419870701725904; Linda K. Tip et al., “Is Support for Multiculturalism Threatened by… 
Threat Itself?” International Journal of Intercultural Relations 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 22–30, 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147176710001057; and Ronald Lee and Timothy, 
Miller, “Immigration, Social Security, and Brooder Fiscal Impact,” The American Economic Review 90, no. 
2 (May 2000): 350–354, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/117249.pdf.  
56 Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration,” 173. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Katja Franco Aas and Mary Bosworth, eds., The Borders of Punishment: Migration, Citizenship and 
Social Exclusion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2013), 30–31.   
59 Tancredo, “Immigration, Citizenship and National Security,” 13–14. 
60 Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration,” 173. 
61 Ibid. 
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In addition, Ibrahim observes that migration is a human security threat in terms of 
“narcotic trafficking.”62 Basically, Ibrahim is saying the population that moves across the 
border to escape war, hunger, or prosecution will be “a threat to the receiving country’s 
population.”63 Further, she points out, “The securitization of migration discourse has 
been cemented by the fear that migrants may be supporters for insurgencies,” and the 
potential driving force for social uprising and terrorist activities.64 Additionally, 
Alexandra Spencer links immigration with terrorism by conducting research based on 
interviews with 48 immigrant terrorists who carried out successful terrorist attacks in the 
United States between 1993 and 2001.65 The research concludes that the terrorist 
infiltration took place in the United States because of the lapses in immigration policies 
and security measures.66 Spencer concludes that poor immigration policies and 
counterterrorism strategies are a driving force that links terrorism and immigrants in the 
States.67  
A diaspora is made up primarily of refugees and is more likely “to be hostile to 
the regime of the home country.”68 However, some economic migrants may also become 
antagonistic, “especially if they live in democratic countries while the government of 
their homeland is repressive.”69 The relationship of diaspora and conflict has many 
aspects.70  
                                                 
62 Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration,” 169. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 173. 
65 Alexander Spencer, “Linking Immigrants and Terrorists: The Use of Immigration as an Anti-Terror 
Policy,” Online Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 8, no. 1 (2008): 5, 
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/237829585_Linking_Immigrants_and_Terrorists_The_Use_of_I
mmigration_as_an_Anti-Terror_Policy. 
66 Ibid.  
67 Ibid., 5–8. 
68 Hazel Smith and Paul Stares, eds., Diasporas in Conflict: Peace Makers or Peace-Wreckers? 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2007), 90.  
69 Ibrahim, “The Securitization of Migration,” 179–80. 
70 Smith and Stares, Diasporas in Conflict; and Pirkkalainen Paivi and Abdile Mahdi, “The Diaspora-
Conflict-Peace-Nexus: A Literature Review” (working paper no. 1, Diaspeace, March 2009), 8, 
https://jyx.jyu.fi/dspace/bitstream/handle/123456789/36875/DIASPEACE_WP1.pdf?sequence=1.  
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One aspect is that the diaspora can have negative and positive effects on the 
conflict situation.71 According to Pirkkalainen Paivi and Abdile Mahdi, “The best way to 
conceive of the role of diaspora in conflict is to think of the various phases or stages of 
conflict (conflict emergence, continuation escalation, termination and post conflict 
reconstruction) and then to evaluate the possible role diaspora may play in each phase.”72 
In terms of a negative perspective, these communities are more effective in fundraising, 
recruiting, procuring weaponry, and lobbying the adopted government.73 For example, 
the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) has “engaged in political and fundraising activities;” 
half of the PKK’s organizational budget came from the Kurdish diaspora in Europe.74 
Diaspora members generally remain away from the war zone and numerously support to 
achieve their political ideology via financial and other political support.75  
Katja Franko Aas and Mary Bosworth provide an analytical perspective of 
criminalization and immigration in terms of legal actions, social beliefs, and cultural 
disparities, especially in the spectrum of migration control, policies and practices.76 This 
theory analyzes migration patterns and different tools and methods that can be securitized 
in migration.77 Furthermore, the authors argue that open border policies such as 
immigration control, citizenship, and criminal justice should be applied as long-term 
measures because immigrants pose a greater impact on the national security of a 
country.78 
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4. Immigration and Counterterrorism 
As many security analysts expected, following the 9/11 attacks, the linkage 
between immigration and national security increased to an unprecedented level due to 
heightened political polarization and wide-ranging counterterrorism efforts implemented 
in response to the attacks. As the debate concerning immigration reform persisted, a 
number of scholars, law enforcement officials, and policy makers expressed concern over 
security aspects amid the War on Terror.79 Many theories and strategies in the literature 
address counterterrorism; however, the United States, the United Kingdom, and South 
Asian strategies cover most of the spectrum of terrorism.  
a. U.S. Counterterrorism Strategy 
Terrorism threats have received enormous attention during the last decades in the 
United States, and the U.S. War on Terror provides various counterterrorism 
approaches.80 Many scholars have conducted research on countering terrorism in terms of 
immigration and border security.81 For example, Susan Ginsberg, author of Countering 
Terrorists Mobility: Shaping an Operational Strategy, introduces a comprehensive 
strategy for countering terrorist mobility.82 The strategy comprises three steps. Step one 
is to distinguish immigrants and terrorists by developing effective policies and tactics. 
This step relies on “striking a balance among competing concerns over national cohesion, 
economic impact, a spectrum of human rights issues, compassion toward refugees … 
                                                 
79 Flona Tolan et al., Literature, Migration and the War on Terror (New York: Taylor and Francis, 
2012), 2, http://samples.sainsburysebooks.co.uk/9781317985020_sample_828066.pdf; and Kathryn Marie 
Fisher, “Exploring the Temporality in/of British Counterterrorism Law and Law Making,” Critical Studies 
on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (2013): 50–72, doi: 10.1080/17539153.2013.765700. 
80 Sharon Pickering, Jude Mcculloch, and Davis Wright-Neville, “Counter-terrorism, Policing,” 
Counter-Terrorism Policing (2008), 91. See also Robert Burke, Counterterrorism for Emergency 
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Counterterrorism (New York: Routledge, 2016).  
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(Technical report) (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2010), www.rand.org; and Susan Ginsburg, 
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Institute, 2006), 1–18, http://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/countering-terrorist-mobility-shaping-
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[and] attacking human trafficking and maintaining constitutional order”83 while keeping a 
“balance of social unity, prosperity, and justice matters” according to the country’s 
security and legitimacy.84  
Step two is to improve a country’s ability to restrict terrorist movements, which 
requires studying the movement of terrorism and ways to counter and exploit it.85 Step 
three is to employ an effective “terrorist mobility strategy” under the National Counter 
Terrorism Center to achieve three main purposes. The defensive purpose includes “To 
secure travel, immigration and transportation channels, at U.S. borders and globally, from 
undetected terrorist movement and from attack.”86 The offensive purpose includes “ 
exploit[ing] vulnerabilities exposed by the terrorists’ need for clandestine transnational 
and internal movement in order to disrupt these individuals and groups.”87 Finally, the 
deterrence purpose prevents terrorist attacks by employing all means necessary.88  
The terrorist mobility strategy provides the comprehensive use of immigration 
policies and counterterrorism strategies to address the “current immigration crisis largely 
rooted in an ongoing large-scale influx of low-wage workers from Mexico and Central 
America.”89 As such, the United States identifies terrorist threats to the homeland from 
around the globe, which is a vital requirement for focusing “counterterrorism efforts 
throughout the border, immigration and transportation” system.90  
b. British Counterterrorism Strategy 
After the Madrid and London train bombings in 2004 and 2005, respectively, the 
perception of the sources of Islamic terror changed the British counterterrorism 
                                                 
83 Ginsburg, Countering Terrorist Mobility, 1. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid., 14–15. 
86 Ibid. 
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88 Ibid., 1–8. 
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perspective.91 According to the existing literature, British counterterrorism strategies 
focused on policies and legislation.92 In contrast, other strategies have relied on the 
intervention of radicalization through pre-emption, which includes identifying the 
emergence of violence and addressing the structural and psychological factors of 
terrorism.93  
The British National Security Strategy responded to the threats and risks through 
five comprehensive concepts.94 The first is counterterrorism, which includes “building 
capacity to disrupt terrorists at home and overseas by enhancing border protection,” while 
developing capabilities to react to any “attacks or violent extremism.”95 Second is 
“countering the nuclear and Weapon of Mass Destruction” threat by making 
“multilateralism and the rules-based international system….to work with partners beyond 
                                                 
91 Jyttle Klausen, “British Counter-Terrorism after 7/7: Adapting Community Policing to the Fight 
against Domestic Terrorism,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35, no. 3 (2009): 403–420, doi: 
10:1080/13691830802704566; and Bruce Hoffman, “Is Europe Soft on Terrorism?” Foreign Policy, no. 
115 (Summer 1999): 62–76, http://www.jstor.org/stable/1149493.  
92 Jef Huysmans and Alessandra Buonfino, “Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration Asylum 
and Terrorism in Parliamentary Debates in the UK,” Political Studies 56, no. 4 (December 2008), 
doi:10:1111/j.1467-9248.2008.00721.x. See also Peter Clarke, “Learning from Experience: 
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far the preferred method of dealing with terrorism. The government has responded to reasoned cases put 
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93 Charlotte Heath-Kelly, “Counter-Terrorism and the Counterfactual: Producing the ‘Radicalisation’ 
Discourse and the UK PREVENT Strategy,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 15, no. 
3 (2012): 394–415, doi: 10.1111/j.1467-856x.2011.00489.x.  
94 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy of the United Kingdom: Security in an 
Interdependent World (London, UK: Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, March 2008), 10, 
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government, including the private sector.”96 Third is tackling transnational crimes and 
organized crimes by reforming the security sector and deploying civil agencies.97 For 
example, the UK Cabinet Office “estimates that over $20 billion of social and economic 
harm occurs due to organized crimes”; however, through reviews and the inter-linkage of 
activities between the Organized Crime Agency, the UK has drastically managed to 
reduce crimes rates.98 Fourth is planning for civil emergencies and “building resilience,” 
which includes “building a network organization” to react to any crisis.99 For example, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) rates the UK as the best prepared country for 
“pandemic flu” because it has built on its nationwide emergency response system in the 
past few years.100 Fifth is defending against any “state-led” threats using the capacity of 
local and foreign intelligence agencies with strong conventional forces.101  
Apart from the British national security strategy, author Nick Baughan Williams 
introduces “immigration policy as a response to geopolitical threats,” highlighting the 
concepts of securitization and marketization in British immigration policies and 
counterterrorism strategies.102 Basically, marketization develops to keep borders open for 
trade and labor capital mobility but closed for refugees and asylum seekers to “clamp 
down” on terrorists.103 The objective of this strategy is to seal borders from security 
threats and open for market trade, which includes temporary migrants who come for 
employment.104 British policies and laws are based on the Anti-Crime Security Act 
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formulated soon after the September 11 attack that became law in early December 2001 
to prevent international terrorism and secure citizens and immigrants.105  
c. South Asian Counterterrorism Strategy  
According to the literature, the South Asian region (SAR) focuses on threats from 
cross-border terrorism and separatism, the nexus between narcotics, mafias, terrorists, 
and insurgents groups.106 The nation-states of the SAR are “inter-dependent in their 
security matters, and the security of one state is strongly affected by other states’ 
actions.”107 The strategy of SAR combats threats and challenges through democracy, 
secularism, tolerance, regional cooperation, and the rule of law.108 India is similarly 
concerned about the increasing spread of militancy and terrorism in South Asia.109 The 
Indian approach relies on domestic capabilities for dealing with terrorism: federal 
intelligence, the National Investigation Agency (NIA), and large police forces through 
effective co-ordination with the National Counterterrorism Center.110  
Kumar Ramakrishna identifies the strategy for counterterrorism in the Southeast 
Asian theater.111 The counterterrorism strategy concentrates on the long and short term, 
based on intelligence co-operation in the war against terrorism.112 The comprehensive 
counterterrorism strategy of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has 
focused on the “counterterrorist initiatives [of] … continuing and improving … 
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intelligence and financial information sharing,” formulating more counterterrorism 
policies, as well as legal measures.113 Furthermore, initiative has enhanced the “liaison 
between law enforcement agencies,” and strengthening the quick reaction ability through 
educational programs and joint operational training.114 ASEAN counterterrorism is based 
on U.S. counterterrorism policies to minimize trans-border terrorism in Southeast Asia 
through joint co-operation. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
The underdevelopment of immigration policies and counterterrorism strategies in 
Sri Lanka has led to an increase in the numbers of immigrants with mal-intent. The 
diversity of nationalities—Muslims, Tamils, and Christians, among others—helps 
immigrants easily mingle with locals. Starting a business, living comparatively cheaply, 
and learning in public schools support the purposes of immigrants. Softer immigration 
policies and lapses in legal actions have also led immigrants to select Sri Lanka for a 
destination. The hypothesis for this research is that reform of the comprehensive policies, 
the practice of immigration control, and effectively coordinated counterterrorism 
strategies to monitor immigrants can enhance the national security of Sri Lanka.  
The purpose of this research is to assess the effect of continuous immigration on 
national security. Figure 4 shows the factors that must be taken into consideration to 
identify the causes and effects of immigration: 
 
Figure 4.  Conceptualization of Causes and Effects of Immigration 
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E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research analyzes the increase in immigration in Sri Lanka and possible 
impacts on national security. After identifying the pattern of immigration, it is important 
to know the causes of immigration and the reasons immigrants select Sri Lanka. The 
methods of arrival or the mode of migration, policies, and counterterrorism measures will 
be analyzed to identify existing security gaps. Furthermore, the duration of stay is an 
indicator of whether immigrants are staying legally or illegally and whether a proper 
documentary system exists. 
After identifying the causes of immigration, the research analyzes the potential 
threats caused by immigrants socially, politically, and economically and subsequently 
identifies security impacts at regional and national levels. In order to identify potential 
security lapses and measures, the thesis reviews immigration policies, homeland security, 
and counterterrorism strategies of regional India and the island nation of Bahamas to 
derive recommendations for avoiding such future threats in Sri Lanka.  
Figure 5 provides further details to understand the theoretical concept of the thesis 
to distinguish the causes and effects of immigration. Additionally, it also indicates 
possible measures to minimize the illegal flow of immigrants and strategies that are 
required to prevent the act of terrorism in the country.  
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Figure 5.  Operationalization of Immigration for Securiy 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This study is divided into multiple chapters. Chapter II begins with the Sri Lankan 
context and highlights the causes and effects of immigration. It also explains the security 
impacts on the region and particularly on Sri Lanka in social, political, and economic 
terms. Chapter III compares the region of India and the island nation of the Bahamas to 
identify different immigration policies, homeland security and counterterrorism 
measures, and strategies adopted. Chapter IV analyzes the policies and security concepts 
of all three countries and derives recommendations that apply in Sri Lanka. In 
conclusion, Chapter V proposes a new Sri Lankan homeland security model, which 
includes immigration policies and counterterrorism strategies to address immigration and 
national security issues. 
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II. IMMIGRATION IN SRI LANKA  
This chapter lays out immigration and identifies migration patterns like tourism, 
labor, documented and undocumented arrivals, refugees, asylum seekers, as well as 
diaspora and Tamil refugees from South India. Specifically, this chapter examines the 
effects of immigration on national security due to social, political and economic threats 
such as human smuggling, drug trafficking, the rise of terrorism, the rise of religious 
extremism, the influx of labor immigration because of the expansion of foreign markets, 
and the signing of economic and technology cooperation with India. Finally, the chapter 
highlights the measures taken by the government of Sri Lanka to prevent such threats 
posed by immigrants.  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF IMMIGRATION 
Human migration and settlement in Sri Lanka has a continuous record because of 
the island’s proximity to the Indian subcontinent.115 As Mahavamsa, the Sinhalese 
tradition, describes,116 “The first Indian settlers on Sri Lanka—Prince Vijaya and his 700 
followers—landed on the coast near Puttalam” in the Western part of Sri Lanka during 
the fifth century BCE to settle by conquest.117 The Indo-Aryan people from Northern 
India were the first settlers.118 As Sinnappah Arasaratnam and Gerald Hurbert Peiris 
reveal, “Considerable evidence points to Western India as the home of the first 
immigrants, it seems probable that a subsequent wave arrived from the vicinity of Bengal 
and Orissa in the Northeast.”119 Furthermore, as Daya Hewapathirane describes, “Sri 
Lanka was invaded as much as seventeen times by South Indian Dravidian Tamil 
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speaking invaders since 230BCE,” and occupied the Jaffna and Trincomalee areas; 
subsequent waves of Tamil immigrants re-settled in the North, the East and the Kandy 
areas of Sri Lanka as laborers.120 Nevertheless, even before King Vijaya landed in Sri 
Lanka, the tribes called “Yakkas” and “Nagas” inhabited Sri Lanka, fought for their 
survival, and protected the country from invaders.121  
Arab people also arrived as immigrant traders to Sri Lanka. Geographers put Sri 
Lanka at the heart of the Indian Ocean, which had been a trading hub since before Arab 
traders arrived with their new Islamic faith.122 The valuable items of commerce in trade 
were gems, cinnamon, ivory, and elephants. Subsequently, early Muslim immigrant 
settlement took hold in Jaffna and Galle according to their trades.123 Nevertheless, with 
the arrivals of Arabs and Somali traders in the eighth century, Islam began to spread in 
Sri Lanka when native women married Muslim men and converted to Islam. In the “18th 
and 19th centuries, Javanese and Malaysian Muslims brought over by the Dutch and 
British contributed to the growing Muslim population in Sri Lanka.”124 Furthermore, 
Muslim immigrants and Muslim traders settled in the Jaffna and the eastern coastal area 
of Sri Lanka.125 The Muslim traders established very lucrative trading posts in Sri 
Lanka’s early days.126  
Early Muslim settlements did not propagate Islam among native Sri Lankans. 
However, “Sri Lankan Muslims became an ethnically conscious and politically motivated 
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community during the late 19th century due to the revivalist movement.”127 In other 
words, these immigrants established their religious and political ideologies to affirm their 
ethnic identities, which subsequently posed many social and political threats in Sri Lanka.  
B. THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY 
Even though Sri Lanka has been on the receiving end of human migration from 
various eras as described in the previous section, immigrants have posed potential threats 
to the state. Further, migratory phenomena have involved great numbers of people 
crossing national boundaries over several decades; they have changed the demographic, 
economic, social, and political stability of the country.128 As such, this section identifies a 
broader category of threats posed by the immigrants.  
Illegal immigrants are a fear-inspired force that poses many threats to receiving 
states, especially to social welfare systems of countries.129 According to a report released 
by the UNHCR, “Refugees and asylum seekers, IDPs [internally displace persons] and 
refugee returnees in Sri Lanka struggle to meet their basic needs to enhance possible 
asylum.”130 In other words, these returnees can neither integrate and improve their 
livelihood easily as urban refugees nor return from India to Sri Lanka because of the lack 
of a comprehensive national policy to absorb them.131  
On the other hand, the UNHCR reduced its allocations for Sri Lanka from 
$9,128,705 as of June 30, 2014, to $7,662,461 in 2015, indicating that the country should 
have its own resources to provide assistance and ensure protection to asylum seekers 
even if numbers increase over time.132 However, the government of Sri Lanka has made 
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little progress in this regard because of a lack of state resources and the inability to 
compromise state security in terms of the human trafficking network.133 
1. Criminal Activities  
Immigrants affect security in terms of criminal activities. Security breaches occur 
from time to time; however, no set pattern has been identified for these crimes. Similarly, 
common characteristics like a person’s country, background, or intentions cannot identify 
criminal intent unless an incident occurs. Common security issues that many countries 
face are transnational crimes. This threat is rising in the world because of immigration. 
Forms of transnational crimes like human smuggling, drug trafficking, and cross-border 
terrorism are major concerns.  
a. Human Smuggling 
Human smuggling is one of the critical factors affecting national security in Sri 
Lanka due to immigration and the country’s geographic features. Immigrants cross the 
coast illegally from India because of the presence of specific landing points that 
smugglers and fishing captains operate in Mannar, Jaffna, and Negombo.134 According to 
Sri Lanka’s police reports, the police have intercepted 89 vessels engaged in human 
smuggling since 2009. With the support of the Australian Federal Police, the Sri Lankan 
Navy arrested 4,500 passengers, 250 crewmembers, 450 facilitators.135  
As Chathuri Dissanayake indicates, the main facilitators of illegal smuggling are 
fishermen, who are often associated with illegal activities because of a lack of regular 
income and limited employment opportunities during seasons of bad weather.136 A 
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successful smuggler can bring in around 300,000 rupees, or $2,126, per boat trip to 
destinations such as Australia and India.137 Additionally, the rate for a migrant skipper 
usually ranges “from one million rupees ($7,087) to 1.5 million rupees ($10,630)” per 
boat, and that money is shared among the crew.138 Similarly, many ex-combatants from 
the LTTE engage in human smuggling.139  
b. Drug Trafficking 
Drug trafficking is another potential threat to national security today. Figure 6 
indicates the quantity of drugs seized by the police; notably, the number of people 
arrested in 2016 is much greater than in 2015. 
 
Figure 6.   Quantity of Drugs Seized by the Police Narcotics Bureau.140 
According to statistics available in Sri Lanka, the value of daily drug consumption 
is estimated at $3 million. Around 45,000 people are addicted to drugs in the country, 
consuming total 763 kilograms of heroin per year; the total estimated heroin “smuggled 
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to Sri Lanka is around 3.5 tons per year.”141 The flow of heroin exceeds the requirement 
that the country demands because Sri Lanka has become a transit hub for drugs, and its 
sea lines of communication as well as sea lanes of trades run through the southern portion 
of the country. In addition, over 200 ships and empty tankers transit Sri Lankan territorial 
waters carrying energy (gas and oil) to and from the Middle East, China, Japan, and 
Korea.142  
Additionally, “India routinely reported the trafficking of large scale consignments 
of heroin from the Southern parts of India into Sri Lanka via the Palk Straits.”143 
Furthermore, many Indians, Pakistanis, and Moldavian nationalists have been arrested 
carrying heroin in the Sri Lanka’s Bandaranaike International Airport; however, the lack 
of a screening system on the airport premises allows immigrants to move freely without 
being caught.144 Lapses in such important measures have increased the number of illegal 
immigrants crossing into Sri Lanka with a goal of transporting drugs within and outside 
the country.  
2. Terrorism 
An increase in criminal activities due to immigrants and refugees from Tamil 
Nadu has become a critical indicator of reemergence LTTE cells. According to Louise 
Shelley, a professor of crime and terrorism, terrorists are often supported by crime and 
frequently change identities as criminals and terrorists.145 As Ibrahim explains, “The 
securitization of migration discourse has been cemented by the fear that migrants may be 
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supporters for insurgencies.”146 In other words, terrorists create a causal link between 
immigrants and other criminal groups to finance their organizations. While the guerilla 
forces have been defeated, the new Tamil tigers provide many opportunities for 
conducting covert illegal actions. The covert operations include the global mafia, 
activities in terror networks, and criminal activities.147 Rohan Gunaratna, the head of the 
International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research, suggests that human 
smugglers have assembled the most asylum seekers and illegal immigrants transported to 
Australia by boat from India to Indonesia via Sri Lanka.148  
Furthermore, former LTTE combatants smuggle people across the globe. Even 
after the LTTE was dismantled in Sri Lanka in 2009, its “overseas terrorist network is 
integral and the group remains active in Northern Sri Lanka, India’s Tamil Nadu, 
Western Europe and Australia,” collecting money, raising funds, and holding financial 
resources, business, and property overseas for future terrorist activities.149  
On the other hand, immigrants also pose threats to the country’s social security as 
a result of ethnic differences. As Weiner describes, “Migration can be perceived as 
threatening by government of either population-sending or population-receiving 
communities.”150 The identity issue mainly affects societal security, but it also “concerns 
the ability of a society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions of 
possible or actual threats.”151 In terms of migrants, “it reflects the ways in which 
members of a receiving state perceive their cultural, linguistic, religious, or national 
identity to be threatened by such immigrants.”152 As far as national identity is concerned, 
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a traditional immigrant-receiving state may have different perceptions. Western countries 
may be more tolerant and supportive of a policy of multiculturalism, whereas countries 
with a rising immigrant population face unintended consequences like communal 
violence, social uprisings, and ethnic discrimination.153 Immigrants in such circumstances 
not only change the country’s culture or demography but may also drive the country to 
violence and ethnic conflict.  
Sri Lanka also faced similar threats in history and the recent past. For example, 
As Daya Hewapathirane describes, the social and cultural division of the Tamils and 
Sinhalese goes back many years to the invasion of Tamil-speaking Dravidians.154 
However, Bart Klem identifies that rivalry of the two ethnics groups emerged even before 
that, “in times of external threats from South India after the formulation of clear 
Sinhalese and Tamil ethnic or cultural identities in the 9th century.”155 Forces of 
“Sinhalese nationalism [have been] perpetuating notion of eternal conflict with Tamils 
had been gathering strength” over time.156  
Then came the civil war with its marked ethnic and sectarian aspects. The brutal 
territorial struggle expanded over 30 years and made the country a war zone rife with 
deadly attacks, including suicide bombings. Starting in 1983, between 80,000 and 
100,000 people—including Sinhalese, Muslim and Tamil civilians—were killed in the 
conflict.157 The Sri Lankan security forces conducted a major campaign (a humanitarian 
operation from 2006 to 2009) against the LTTE, bringing the entire country into the 
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government’s democratically minded political mechanism.158 However, recent 
intelligence reports indicate the reemergence of LTTE cells in Sri Lanka.  
The existing refugee crisis—due to questions surrounding the refugees and 
asylum seekers who fled to Tamil Nadu during the war—has created a situation that 
encourages younger Tamils to join new LTTE cells. Major displacements took place 
between 2008 and 2009 when nearly “200,000 people fled to government-controlled 
territory,” with a majority fleeing to South India by sea.159 Furthermore, according to 
available statistics, 30,000 IDPs remain in camps after arriving from Tamil Nadu as 
immigrants and asylum seekers.160 These groups are more vulnerable to any insurgency, 
ethnic uprising or terrorist activities.161 Recent insurgent activities are classic indicators 
of the re-emergence of the LTTE cells. Martha Crenshaw identifies a “distinct pattern of 
organizational evaluation.” She points out that over time, groups form, split, merge, 
collaborate, compete, decline, and grow.162 This theory is applicable to the present Sri 
Lankan context. Approximately 2,000 or more ex-combatants narrowly escaped during 
the humanitarian operation and live in Sri Lanka or Tamil Nadu in India, or abroad.163  
Since 2009, several attempts have been made by the LTTE to regroup and 
reorganize inside and outside the country. The first attempt, made on March 2012 by the 
former LTTE cadre known as Kumaran living in Paris, recruited 15 ex-LTTE cadres from 
Tamil Nadu for clandestine operations in Sri Lanka.164 These groups have organized into 
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three cells of five members to carry out killings at Trincomalee; however, the mission 
terminated unsuccessfully due to a defector among them.165  
The second attempt happened in December 2012; a group of ex-LTTEs, including 
a top expert in explosives, with financial assistance from overseas, entered Tamil Nadu to 
recruit and indoctrinate Sri Lankan Tamil youth with the LTTE ideology. The police 
arrested the plotters in a house in Chennai, India with incriminating documents, 
electronic circuits, and panels.166  
The third attempt occurred in March 2014, which culminated in the arrest of 
former LTTE cadre member Gopi, who opened fire on police officers during a routine 
check in the Kilinochchi area.167 Government forces immediately cleared the area and 
arrested Gopi who had a metal detector that allowed him to find arms and explosives 
dumped by the LTTE during the “final stage of the battle.”168 These isolated incidents 
suggest undercover operations by small cells of LTTE combatants in this post-conflict 
situation threaten the national security in Sri Lanka. 
The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora is a politically and ethnically motivated group that 
consists of immigrants, labor migrants, refugees, and travelers.169 In the recent past, the 
government of Sri Lanka has provided opportunities for the Tamil diaspora who lives 
abroad to return home.170 Nevertheless, there is a strong belief that the diaspora, asylum 
seekers, and Tamil returnees are linked to LTTE cells in Sri Lanka.171 For example, the 
government of Sri Lanka has accused people returning from asylum in such countries as 
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Britain and Scandinavian countries, with active Tamil diaspora communities, of being 
actively associated with terrorists in Sri Lanka.172  
The Tamil diaspora consists of different organizations. The Global Tamil Forum 
(GTF), the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE), and the British Tamil 
Forum (BTF) are important elements.173 On the other hand, all organizations look at the 
potential for new military wings in Sri Lanka, especially among the young Tamil 
generation who can be radicalized to honor thousands of Tamil civilians who sacrificed 
their lives during the conflict.174 The LTTE as a military group was defeated at home, but 
its network overseas survives, and the organization is moving toward a global terror 
network.175 The lobby is powerful not only in host countries , “but also [in] international 
forums like the UN, the World Bank, the IMF and other important stakeholders.”176  
In addition, remnants of the LTTE and Tamil diaspora have galvanized the Tamil 
youth overseas and used them for a malicious propaganda campaign and active role in 
LTTE network functions abroad.177 For example, a number of young Tamil students in 
India and Europe held public protests for 19 days in a hunger strike to call international 
attention to the situation in Sri Lanka.178 Furthermore, the aim of the diaspora network is 
to raise alternative voices to create “cultural dialog with the international community and 
the government of Sri Lanka.”179 The young Tamil community could play a vital role in 
replacing leadership because its generation has been brought up with university degrees 
from Western countries.180 Because younger Tamils have now become active in the 
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diaspora’s political role in support of conflict in the homeland resulting from 
immigration, they pose a greater impact on the security issues in Sri Lanka.  
3. Religious Extremism 
A new threat of religious extremism emerged because of the effects of recent 
immigration. America’s foreign intelligence service recognized that “Wahhabism would 
be an effective rival theology to prevent the spread of Iranian influence in Sri Lanka” 
since the Eastern province has been successfully penetrated by Saudi agents.181 
Traditionally, Sufism is the primary Islamic sect observed throughout South Asia, which 
includes Sri Lanka.182 According to Daya Hewapathirane, “Sufism is considered to be the 
mystical, ascetic branch of Islam which emphasis a personal experience with Allah.”183 
As the Asian Tribune defines, “Wahhabism is a new politico-religious movement, which 
is sweeping the Eastern province of Sri Lanka with more than 50 Muslim fundamentalist 
organizations supporting, helping and propagating the movement throughout the 
island.”184 Such emergence of homegrown extremist activities due to immigration has 
threatened the country and the people of the Eastern province.  
Many Muslim countries and extremist groups have provided military assistance, 
including military training in the Middle East, to various Muslim organizations in Sri 
Lanka as a result of recent immigration.185 For example, many Sri Lankan Muslim youths 
have acquired military training in Lebanon through politically motivated armed Muslim 
organizations, coordinated by the powerful Muslim minister who represents the Eastern 
Province in the parliament of Sri Lanka.186  
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Similarly, Sri Lankan “madrasa” students have enrolled in religious schools on 
Afghan–Pakistani border and have been actively engaged in the Afghan conflict.187 
Additionally, some of them have studied in “Egypt under the sponsorship of the Muslim 
Brotherhood.”188 Moreover, many religious activists from Pakistan, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have regularly visited as immigrants and pilgrims to Sri Lanka 
for religious teachings related to radical Islam.189 Thus, an ongoing immigration process 
has created the space to radicalize many Muslim youth in the northern and eastern Sri 
Lanka.  
More than 100 Sri Lankan Muslim youths are presently engaging in ISIS 
activities in Syria and Iraq; a very “efficient recruitment drive of ISIS is progressing in 
the Middle East, targeting mainly foreign nationalists.”190 As such, the security 
establishment is concerned about two aspects: first, “the existence of Islamic state-linked 
jihadist networks in the country” and second, identifying “other Sri Lankan nationals 
fighting for the jihadist group in Iraq and Syria.”191  
At present, the entire region is active with dozens of Islamic terror activities, and 
it is only a matter of time before extremists are drawn to Sri Lanka. For example, so far, 
Afghanistan and Pakistan have been badly affected due to Islamic terrorism; above all, 
these groups are famous in exporting terrorism.192 India repeatedly suffers from Islamic 
terror attacks on a large scale, for example, the Mumbai train bombing in 2006 and the 
Mumbai bombing in 2008.193 A number of Islamic terrorist groups are active throughout 
India, Bangladesh, Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and now Singapore, which has a 
greater impact on security in the region and Sri Lanka due to immigration.  
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4. Influx of Labor Immigration 
 Immigration also affects the economy in the receiving country. According to 
Osvaldo Muniz, Wei Li, and Yvonne Schleicher, “Immigration has a significant 
economic impact on both the receiving country and the country of origin.”194 In other 
words, immigrants generate both costs and benefits for the economy; the security arena in 
the economic sector encourages economic reformists to think deeply about the impact on 
immigrants and the state’s economy.195 However, Sri Lankan public opinion is that 
immigrants have taken jobs from native-born workers since the early days of the country.  
For example, as Ahmed H. Ilyas asserts that “the bulk of the Indian Tamil 
plantation workers in Sri Lanka were drawn from the most depressed and lowest caste 
groups in South India.”196 In other words, a distinct ethnic group from Tamil Nadu, India, 
had been brought to Sri Lanka in the 19th century as plantation laborers, primarily 
working on the coffee and later tea plantations of the British.197 The manual labor issue 
was strange to Sri Lankan society because the Sinhalese Kandyans provided physical 
labor initially when there were few plantations in the mid-18th century.198 However, 
within a few years, Sinhalese Kandyan workers withdrew from the plantations due to an 
influx of laborers, and some hostilities arose over Tamils taking away the jobs of the 
native people of Sri Lanka.199  
Immigration has had different influences on the state economy and on major 
construction projects. In the recent past, Indian and Chinese companies have dominated 
Sri Lanka’s large-scale business projects, creating a labor influx that affected native 
businesses in Sri Lanka. As Bandula Sirimanna points out, “Sri Lanka’s entire mega 
projects business has been farmed out to four Chinese companies and seven Indian 
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companies, with over 30,000 semi-skilled and unskilled Chinese workers displacing local 
laborers.”200 As such, Chinese companies presently handle a special economic zone: a 
1000-acre tapioca farm at Hambantota Port; Norochcholai, a 900-megawatt, coal-fired 
power plant; the Colombo-Katunayake expressway; and the Pallai-Kankesanthurei rail-
line.201  
Parallel to the Sri Lankan–Chinese business partnership, India drives all its efforts 
to dominate market enterprises in Sri Lanka with huge investments, especially among 
macro-level entrepreneurs.202 For example, many companies, such as Mumbai based 
Company, handle super-luxury housing projects in the Kilinochchi and Mullativu 
districts.203 Furthermore, the power grid cooperation of India Limited; the National 
Thermal Power Cooperation, a Lankan–Indian oil cooperation; and Lanka Asok Leyland 
has made a massive investment to develop business on the island. Nearly one hundred 
Indian companies presently operate in Sri Lanka.204  
The signing of the Economic and Technology Cooperation Act (ETCA) with 
India is another impending economic issue in terms of immigration. As the Economic 
Times describes, the leading Sri Lankan trade chamber has welcomed the proposed 
ETCA with “India to boost cooperation in technical areas, scientific expertise and 
research among institutions as well as to boost standards of goods and services that are 
able to compete in the global market and improve opportunities for manpower training 
human resource development.”205 However, Sri Lankan opposition has criticized the 
planned economic agreement with India as an attempt to “foreignize” the economy and 
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labor market; thus, an agreement would prove useful to India but provide minimal 
benefits to the economic interests of Sri Lanka.206  
Additionally, in February 2016, the doctors’ trade union and several other 
employee organizations have taken to the streets to protest the ETCA. According to the 
president of the Computer Society of Sri Lanka, many illegal immigrants can stay in Sri 
Lanka without any visas or work permits because of lapses in immigration policies in the 
ETCA agreement.207 In making the comment, the Computer Society president argues that 
when Indians work in Japan, the Middle East, and Singapore, they work on strict, limited 
working visas, whereby assigned economic laborers must leave such countries as soon as 
possible.208 However, in the Sri Lankan situation, Indian laborers have the right to stay in 
Sri Lanka according to the proposed ETCA. Thus “the influx of workers from India 
easily fill low-level jobs,” thereby robbing local talent of employment. Moreover, Indian 
labor immigrants “not only take jobs away from native citizens, but they also take away 
social benefits” such as state welfare and government benefits.  
C. MEASURES TAKEN BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SRI LANKA 
This section is designed to identify the measures taken by the government of Sri 
Lanka—especially immigration sources and policies, administrative practices to monitor 
flow of immigration and the visa process, border control and security management, and 
the UNCHR to Sri Lanka to prevent a flow of irregular immigrants. Furthermore, this 
section discusses existing counterterrorism strategies such as laws, policies, legislation, 
and border security as well as existing policies to counter the financing of terrorism. 
1. Immigration Sources and Policies  
Sri Lanka has introduced immigration sources and policies to prevent illegal 
immigration and absorb a smooth flow of economic and skilled workers. As such, several 
agencies maintain proper documentation of immigration in terms of international 
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migration and statistics, of which the major source for obtaining statistics is the 
Department of Immigration and Emigration (DIE).209 The DIE is responsible for border 
protection and provides border statistics accordingly. In addition, the Sri Lankan Bureau 
of Employment (SLBFE) records migration figures and maintains a data bank on migrant 
labors; likewise, the UNHCR produces statistics on asylum seekers, refugees, and 
repatriation.210  
Similarly, the Department of Census and Statistics collects limited information of 
foreigners and family members upon their arrival.211 Additionally, the SLBFE and other 
agencies conduct random checks to measure the characteristics of immigrants such as 
“country of birth and citizenship.”212 However, the existing policies for identifying 
undocumented immigrants in Sri Lanka have been less effective.213 As a result, a recent 
influx of immigrants, especially from Tamil Nadu, have been observed in Sri Lanka. 
a. Measures Taken to Monitor the Immigration-Visa Process. 
Immigration acts and laws are important for monitoring immigrants as well as for 
preventing the flow of illegal immigration. The Immigrants and Emigrants Act No. 20 of 
1948 and following amendments to visas provide legal status to enter and stay in Sri 
Lanka.214 The head of the Foreign Affairs Ministry of Sri Lanka and the Controller 
Department of Immigration and Emigration in Colombo are vested with the authority to 
issues visas for individuals to stay in the country.215 Moreover, based on the immigration-
processing requirement, any foreigner can apply for a non-residential or residential visa 
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through the consular of the Department of Immigration and Emigration to remain in Sri 
Lanka. 216  
Conversely, a formal letter, such as an endorsement from the Board of 
Investment, a foreign mission, or the line of ministries in Sri Lanka, must be produced to 
obtain a visa.217 Such effective measures, especially in immigration and emigration 
channels, only monitor the flow of legal immigration.  
b. Border Control 
In 1949, the Department of Immigration and Emigration of Sri Lanka was 
established and has had total responsibility for border control.218 Furthermore, “the 
Immigrants and Emigrants Act No. 20 of 1948 provided comprehensive regulation of the 
flow of persons to and from the country.”219 On the other hand, limited exits allow 
passengers to arrive and depart from Sri Lanka, namely via the Bandaranayake 
International Airport in Katunayake and the Mattala International Airport in Hambantota; 
however, Colombo and Trincomalee harbors are rarely used by travelers because such 
habours are designed for sea cargo transportation.220  
c. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees to Sri Lanka 
UNHCR involvement in Sri Lanka started when the government requested the 
UNHCR’s assistance in collecting data on “repatriation, refugees abroad and refugees 
and asylum seekers” in 1987, especially, in assisting with “large scale repatriation of Sri 
Lankan refugees from India.”221 Regarding international migration, the UNHCR collects 
data throughout the registration process in Sri Lanka.222  
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Data on repatriation falls into two categories—as they do in India and other 
countries. The majority of refugees from India comprise documented and undocumented 
immigrants. According to Constance Johnson, “The government of Sri Lanka is in the 
process of revising the country’s 2006 immigration law, with the goal of curtailing illegal 
smuggling immigrants.”223 As Johnson points out, the changes include punishment for 
human smugglers, and those convicted of profiting from exploiting migrants will lose 
their assets and be subjected to terms of imprisonment up to 20 years.224  
2. Counterterrorism Strategies 
The counterterrorism strategy of Sri Lanka is based on countering the financing of 
terrorism and preventing terrorism. The Sri Lankan government defeated terrorism in 
2009. However, the government of Sri Lanka remains concerned over financial support 
and the international network of the LTTE. The government of Sri Lanka maintains a 
strong military presence in the North and East and remains concerned about pro-LTTE 
sympathizers and a possible re-emergence of LTTE cells.225 Accordingly, laws have 
introduced a new aspect of “prevention to the existing deterrence and correction 
strategies of criminal justice,” especially to prevent militants from committing violent 
acts.226  
The government of Sri Lanka has introduced five broad categories of 
counterterrorism legislation: first, the constitution augmented by emergency provisions to 
counter an emergency situation; second, “laws of proscription that criminalize banned 
militant groups and a range of undesirable activities that are detrimental to the safety of 
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the people” and the state; third, special laws against the military like the U.S. Patriot 
Act227 and the British Prevention of Terrorism Act;228 fourth, the Indian Armed Forces 
Special Power Act,229 which include special laws that give “immunity and additional 
special powers to the security forces”; and fifth, “laws on the control of finances, money 
laundering, and drug trafficking” that are primarily defined in the legislation.230  
a. Preventive Measures (Legislation, Border Security, and Law 
Enforcement)  
Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism legislation has principally focused on the prevention 
of terrorism. The Prevention of Terrorism Act was enacted in 1982 as a measure in 
wartime that provided the armed forces the “powers to search, arrest and detain 
individuals.”231 Furthermore, in 2013, the government of Sri Lanka became an active 
member of the U.S. State Department’s defence and energy cooperation, homeland 
security.232 Furthermore, the government of Sri Lanka has continued to vote for securing 
its maritime border with the United States since 2013.233  
Border security remains significant because it consists of the state’s export and 
control system and documented fraud recognition. The International Organization of 
Migration (IOM) tracks, profiles, identifies, arrests, and prosecutes violators, among 
other border control–associated activities.234  
Similarly, the government of Sri Lanka started coordinating with the government 
of Canada on counterterrorism programs based on two border security–related projects. 
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First is the Interpol database system, which stores and shares real time information. 
Second is the lost and stolen passport program that addresses similar border control 
issues to those Sri Lanka faces.235 Along the same line, the 2013 bilateral agreement on 
information sharing called Advance Passenger Information remarkably strengthened the 
collaboration among Sri Lanka and its EU counterparts.236 Furthermore, the government 
of Australia in collaboration with other countries facilitated an online program for 
passport fingerprinting in 2014 to combat illegal migration.237  
b. Countering the Financing of Terrorism 
Countering terrorism financing requires regional and global cooperation and 
coordination. Sri Lanka is a member of the Eurasian Group on “Combating Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (EAG).”238 Additionally, the government of Sri 
Lanka belongs to the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) as does its regional partner 
India and the United States.239 Further, Sri Lanka was welcomed by the FATF in June 
2006 to advance and improve anti-money laundering efforts, counter terrorist financing , 
and monitor the FATF’s process to encourage the operationalization of its measures to 
identity and freeze the assets of terrorists.240  
The Suppression of Terrorist Financing Act No. 25 of 2005, adopted by 
the Sri Lankan Parliament on July 7, 2005 to give effect to the UN 
Convention on Suppression of Terrorist Financing of 1999, of which Sri 
Lanka is a signatory, is the latest addition to the country’s 
counterterrorism laws. Under this law, providing or collecting funds for 
terrorist activities is an offense (Section 3 [1] [2]), punishable by fifteen to 
twenty years’ imprisonment, in addition to a fine (Section 3 [4]). In sum, 
Sri Lanka’s counterterrorism laws are characterized by: one emphasis on 
protection of the state rather than people; two, overreaction to the threat 
posed and measures that are far more drastic than necessary; three, hasty 
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enactment without much scope for public debate or judicial scrutiny; four, 
inadequate safeguards against misuse of these laws.241  
The issue of immigration in Sri Lanka has not been critical on the political agenda 
of the government. The immigration crisis and national security threats need careful 
assessment because the issue of immigration becomes easily communalized. Given the 
foreign market expansion based largely on the economic landscape of India and China, 
Sri Lanka’s expanding economy may prevent the government from addressing the 
immigration issue. However, with the rise of criminal activities and frequency of terrorist 
and extremist incidents, the government cannot overlook the issues of immigration-
security threats but must find solutions. 
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III. IMMIGRATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF INDIA AND THE BAHAMAS 
Migration is a complex process that raises many security concerns and has direct 
effects on countries of origin and destinations. Many states face various challenges 
associated with immigration, some of which affect national security. This chapter looks at 
two states: India and the Bahamas. India is a much larger state than Sri Lanka and its 
closest neighbor. Thus, many of India’s migration issues, particularly concerning 
terrorism, emerge in Sri Lanka, as well. The Bahamas is an island nation with some 
specific migration issues that parallel Sri Lanka’s experience, particularly with respect to 
illegal immigration. 
This chapter discusses the measures taken by both countries to prevent the arrival 
of illegal immigrants and examines the causes and effects of immigrants on national 
security in social, economic, and political terms. It also examines such measures as 
immigration policies, homeland security, and counterterrorism strategies that have been 
adopted by both countries to overcome possible threats.  
A. INDIA 
South Asia with India as its center has witnessed amazing and complex 
phenomena of human migration: the South Bhutanese of “Nepali origin” have fled to 
Nepal, the Chakmas of Bangladesh migrated to India, and the Tamils of Indian origin 
have sheltered in India from Sri Lanka.242 Consequently, causes of migration are complex 
and varied. As described by Sharma and Bhushan, there are 12 illegal flows of 
immigration in South Asia, especially to India: 
(i) India-Pakistan refugee flow, 1947-48 involving 15,000,000 Hindus and 
Muslims, (ii) exodus of Burmese Indians numbering about 1,000,000 
during 1948-65, (iii) exodus of Srilankan Indians and Tamils to the tune of 
about 1,000,000 from 1954 which is still continuing, (iv) flight of almost 
10,000,000 Bangladeshis to India in 1971, (v) "stranded" Pakistanis in 
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Bangladesh numbering about 300000, (vi) flight of 200,000 Burmese 
Muslims to Bangladesh in 1978, (vii) flight of 100000 chakmas into India 
in 1981, (viii) some 3000000 Afghans moved to Pakistan during 1978-93 
of which about 2000000 have since returned, (ix) flight of Tibetans to 
India from 1958 to 1963 numbering about 100000, (x) exodus of nearly 
60000 Bhutanese of Nepalese origin to Nepal in 1990-91, (xi) unestimated 
and unaccounted immigration of Nepalis into India; and finally (xii) the 
massive, controversial and unwanted population flow from Bangladesh to 
Assam, West Bengal and Tripura in particular, and other parts of India in 
general.243  
 
1. Historical Background of the Migration from Bangladesh to the 
Assam State 
 
Figure 7.   Map of Assam State.244  
The influx of illegal immigrants poses many threats to Assam in India. During the 
occupation of the British in Northeast India, rivalries among the local tribes and 
massacres left the area largely uninhabited.245 However, at the initial stage under British 
                                                 
243 Sharma and Bhushan, “Illegal Immigration of Bangladeshis into India.”  
244 Source: “Assam (Asom) District Map,” Maps of World, 
http://www.mapsofworld.com/india/assam/.  
245 Shahnawaz Ahmad Mantoo, “Bangladesh Illegal Immigration: Effects and Consequences,” 
Journal of Eurasian Studies 4, no. 3 (July 2012): 38–39, 
http://epa.oszk.hu/01500/01521/00015/pdf/EPA01521_EurasianStudies_0312_038-053.pdf.  
 47 
control, the immigrant population from neighboring regions, such as Bengal, Bihar, and 
Nepal, settled in the area and helped develop the region.246 These migrants changed the 
demography and the ecology of the area with their occupation of native lands and the 
forest reserve.247  
As a result, the British initiated the East Bengal Frontier Regulation in 1873248 to 
minimize the movement of the Bengali Muslim immigrants, but such regulations became 
unsuccessful because better living conditions and a “shortage of labor” brought an influx 
of immigrants.249 Further, “after the partition of Bengal in 1905, Muslims from over-
populated East Bengal started moving to the fertilized lands in less populated areas.”250 
Yet an incomplete 4,096-kilometer border fence on the India–Bangladesh line remained 
porous.251 Assam in northeastern India was the most affected by the influx of illegal 
migrants from Bangladesh for two reasons. First was the uncontrolled growth of the 
population, which resulted in a crisis of living space in Bangladesh. Second was natural 
disaster, such as flood, landslide and earthquake.  
Further, the differences in growth rates between Assam and the rest of India 
during the pre-independence period showed that Assam’s population increased 103.51 
percent while the rest of the country’s rate was 33.67 percent.252 Today, Assam is home 
to about five million illegal immigrants, and those immigrants pose many security threats 
to the region.253 This immigration crisis in Assam has shown that the government of 
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India needs possible measures to revise existing laws and introduce new policies to 
prevent an influx of immigrants from Bangladesh. 
2. Causes and Effects on National Security 
India perceives immigration as a threat to security because of rapid increases in 
illegal immigration from Bangladesh. This section lays out such possible security threats 
as socio-economic friction, political instability, the rise of religious extremism and ISIS 
threats, and criminal activities due to immigration as well as measures taken by the 
government of India to mitigate threats. The section focuses on Bangladeshi migrants 
into India’s Assam region. 
a. Economic and Socio-Cultural Threats 
The economy of Assam state is rooted in the agriculture sector with products like 
tea, petroleum, and lumber.254 Further, agriculture is the predominant activity in the daily 
life of the majority of Assam’s population; however, massive illegal migration from 
Bangladesh creates pressure on the land, employment, and other financial, social, and 
welfare benefits.255 As Chirantan Kumar identifies, “the easy availability and readiness of 
the migrant workers to work at a very low wage rate and the general impression that the 
migrant workers are more hardworking, has worked against the local workers.”256 In 
other words, Kumar believes that the influx of migration has increased the unemployment 
issue among native people in the state, especially in every economic sector.257 Similarly, 
the problems of deforestation, land grabs, trade competition, and illegal occupancy by 
undocumented migrants have also greatly strained the natural resources in the state.258  
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On the one hand, a significant fear among the Assamese people is that the 
indigenous culture is overwhelmed due to an increasing number of immigrants.259 In 
addition, Assam has become more dangerous because the demographic invasion may 
result in this geo-strategically vital district turning into a Muslim majority.260 On the 
other hand, it is also feared that immigrant Bengalis will outnumber the locals in Tripura 
and wield political power, which might also affect the Assam region. For example, the 
Bengali immigrants who have consolidated along religious lines—such as the “Assam 
United Democratic Front (AUDF) supported by 14 extremist and fundamentalist 
groups”—alarm people because of their rapid raise.261 This phenomenon has created 
socio-cultural tensions in Assam because of the competition among locals for 
employment and land for cultivation. Consequently, these migrants not only pose 
economic and socio-cultural threats but also a communal imbalance.  
b. Political Threats 
The high rate of migration from Bangladesh into Assam has resulted in political 
power being taken away from the locals. As Dutta and Das describe, “The unabated 
influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh into Assam and the consequent perceptible 
change in the demographic pattern of the state has been a matter of grave concern.”262 In 
other words, the Assam people believe that illegal immigrants from Bangladesh “threaten 
to reduce their community to a minority in their own state.”263 Additionally, the report 
notes that illegal immigration to Assam was the core issue of community violence such as 
the Assam student movement and outbreaks of insurgency in the area.264 However, the 
AUDF participation in politics may possibly establish a close link with the immigrant 
community in Assam to stay in political power, and “the general perception is that this 
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close ally could lead to a shift of political power from the hand of local Assamese people 
to the Bangladeshis.”265 In short, illegal immigration not only jeopardizes the balance of 
the political system but also increases religious tension in the Assam region.  
(1) Terrorism  
Undocumented immigrants from Bangladesh have been engaged in terror 
activities in many parts of India.266 According to Sharma and Bhushan, the beginning of 
incidents such as the Nellie Massacre (1983) and the demolition of a Mosque (1992), an 
organization called the United Social Reform Army of Assam formed in 1992 to protect 
the interest of Muslims in the Assam state.267 Furthermore, because of radicalization, 
these groups created a stereotype of immigrants with many consequences for India. For 
example, members of the Jamaal-e-Islam group of Bangladesh active in Manipur has 
links to a number of Islamic groups (jihadi, Bangladeshi, and Pakistani terror groups and 
ISIS) and illegal Bangladeshi immigrants in Assam.268 Many Muslim militants as well as 
fundamentalist groups found Assam to be the most suitable place to carry out their pre-
planned activities because millions of Bangladeshi Muslims illegally residence in the 
Assam state.269 Hence, the rise of extremism in Assam created a situation that radicalized 
the youth near the borders of India and Bangladesh.270 
Along the Indian–Bangladeshi border, many training camps operate in places 
where most of the youth receive training using modern weapons from terrorist groups as 
a result of illegal immigration and a lack of border security.271 As Dutta and Das 
highlight, madrasas in Assam state have mushroomed in recent years; this has caused an 
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even greater security impact on the Assam state. For example, as the report noted in 
2009, Assam had 28,000 students actively engaged in terror activities.272 As such, these 
extremist terror groups attempted to separate the entire North and East, especially the 
Assam state, from India.273 In addition, several reports have noted the tremendous growth 
of extremist terror activities, including suicide bombings and political assassinations that 
target top-level political leaders and government elites in the Assam state.274 Such 
activities in Assam not only threaten the region but also inspire fear in the people of other 
regions in India. 
(2) Al Qaeda and ISIS 
Major global Islamic terrorist groups like al Qaeda and the Islamic State are 
operating and reportedly eyeing the region and other parts of India. According to N. 
Nijeesh, ISIS in its quest for world domination has included Assam among other parts of 
India, and that creates a rising interest among many people in Assam.275 Further, Assam 
has a religious extremism ideology that helps people radicalize and join with other 
terrorist organizations including ISIS.276 Additionally, as per the police reports, a 
suspected Islamic State operative, identified as Suman Aziz Lasker (ground-level leader), 
has recently been arrested by the police during a stay in Assam as a traveler.277 Both 
states have Maoist/Naxalite terrorism as an expanding trans-border terrorist threat 
actively operate in central and eastern India because of illegal infiltration by 
immigrants.278 It follows an increase in terrorist movements in Assam and indicates the 
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establishment of new global terrorist networks and the rise of criminal activities in the 
region. 
c. Criminal Activities  
The main anti-social activities of illegal immigrants in Assam include the 
associated crimes of smuggling, robbery, prostitution, beggary, and trafficking in women 
and children. According to Saikia Plabita, “The present day rise of crime in Assam has 
touched a sensitive level of concern and the news of involvement of illegal immigrants 
particularly from Bangladesh is very frequently focused.”279 In other words, illegal 
immigrants from neighboring Bangladesh have fled to Assam, thereby increasing the rate 
of crime in the state.280  
The results shown in Figure 8 indicate a district-wide average rate of crimes 
committed by the immigrants in the Assam state.  
 
Figure 8.  Average Rate of Crime in Assam Region.281 
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According to statistics, migrants who enter India illegally are involved in many criminal 
activities. Similarly, criminal activities are mostly being carried out by gangs and other 
terrorist groups who are involved in narcotics smuggling and other illegal activities for 
the motive of earning easy money for their activities.282 This situation is dangerous and 
requires serious security attention by India now. 
3. Measures Taken by the Government of India 
The increase in security measures to prevent the illegal flow of immigrants from 
Bangladesh and threats posed by such immigrants are of paramount importance to the 
government of India. As such, this section evaluates existing countermeasures taken by 
the government of India, including existing immigration laws, policies, border protection 
and security management, measures for illegal entry and overstay, responses to prevent 
the flow of illegal immigrants, and counterterrorism strategies to combat cross-border 
terrorism and international as well as regional responses to prevent terrorism and the 
financing of terrorism.  
a. Immigration Laws and Border Protection in India 
India has introduced many laws and protection measures to prevent illegal 
infiltration of immigrants. As Indian immigration law describes, “The Indian law relating 
to citizenship or nationalism is mainly governed by the provision of the Indian 
constitution.”283 The constitution provides for a single citizenship for the entire country. 
Further, the Passport Act of 1920,284 the Foreigners Act of 1946,285 and the Regulation of 
Foreigners Act of 1939286 work together to monitor the entry, stay and exit of aliens. As 
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such, all administrative matters pertaining to policies, rules, and regulations related to 
immigration, visas, permanent residence, and the citizenship will be coordinated by the 
Foreigners Division of the Ministry and Home Affairs (MHA).287  
Although the government of India has taken many steps to prevent the illegal flow 
of immigrants from Bangladesh, many infiltrations seen in the region of Assam suggest a 
need for serious revisions in immigration laws and policies.  
b. Illegal Entry and Overstay 
Illegal entry and overstay in India, as in other countries, are strictly prohibited. 
Further, the Passport Rule 3 of 1950 (entry to India) describes that “no person proceeding 
from any place outside India, shall enter or attempt to enter, India by water, land or air,” 
unless “he is in possession of a valid passport confirming the conditions described.”288 
Thus, anyone who violates the above rules or “attempts to enter India on a forged 
passport or visa,” will undergo legal consequences, which includes punishment “by 
imprisonment for a term, which may be extended to three months or with fines or 
both.”289  
c. Border Management and Security 
 Effective border control management and security is important for preventing the 
illegal flow of immigrants, especially men and materials. The primary task of the 
Department of Border Management of the MHA is to protect and secure borders of India 
including coastal areas. The land borders of India extend over 15,107 kilometers, and the 
coastline length is 7,517 kilometers. Specific border spans include  India-Bangladesh 
(4096.7 km), India-Pakistan (3323 km), India-China (3488 km), India-Bhutan (699 km), 
and India-Myanmar (1643 km).290 To ensure the security of the borders, the Border 
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Security Force under the command of the MHA is tasked “to guard India’s land borders 
during war and peacetime and prevent” trannational crimes.291  
The Indo-Tibetan Border Police of India, the Tibet Autonomous Region of China, 
Sashastra Seema Bal Indo-Nepal, and Indo-Bhutan among other border paramilitary 
forces are also included in the MHA for a better command-and-control function.292 
Further, the Assam Rifles, a paramilitary force, functions under the MHA and is 
operationally under the command of the Indian Military to secure the Myanmar border. 
At present, a large number of military and paramilitary forces are deployed along the 
coastal and border states with proper coordination by the MHA.293  
d. Counterterrorism Strategies 
India has faced numerous insurgencies and separatist movements over time. 
Further, terrorists plan irregular bomb strikes in cities and strategically important 
economic locations. Since India has witnessed a new form of organized, sophisticated 
terrorism such as al Qaida and ISIS, however, the Indian government’s reaction to 
terrorist attacks has changed drastically. Today, “Indian counterterrorism cooperation 
with the United States” continues to strengthen depending on the bi-lateral cooperation 
needed for the full spectrum of terrorist threats in order “to eliminate terrorist safe havens 
and infrastructure, disrupt the terror network and financing and stop cross border” 
terrorism.294  
(1) Legislation and Law Enforcement 
India has continued pass laws, legislation, and other measures to counter domestic 
and international terrorism. India banned al Qaida and ISIS on 2014 under the Unlawful 
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Activities Prevention Act.295 Further, India implemented UN Security Council 
Resolutions (UNSCR) 2178 and 2199, and under the UN 1267/1989/2253 imposed 
sanctions against al Qaida and ISIS.296 In addition, India has continued to train its 
military specialists in law-enforcement security-related officials “to enhance capabilities 
of the forces in critical incident management, infrastructure security, community oriented 
policing, crime scenes investigation, explosive ordinance detection and counter measures 
and cyber security” to ensure the institutional capabilities to protect the national security 
of India.297  
(2) Countering the Financing of Terrorism 
India’s primary aim is to counter the financing of terrorism by applying numerous 
measures. India acts as a partner to the United States for anti-money 
laundering/counterterrorism finance.298 Similarly, India has also become “a member of 
the FATF, the Eurasian Group of Combating Money Laundering and Financing 
Terrorism and Asia/Pacific Group on Money laundering.”299 On the other hand, India’s 
Financial Intelligence Unit monitors all data pertaining to money and wire transactions, 
especially suspicious money transactions, to prevent terrorism financing and misuse. 
Thus, a “high degree of training and expertise in financial investigation involving 
transnational crimes or terrorism-affiliated groups” is included in India’s strategy to 
counter the financing of terrorism at present.300  
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(3) International and Regional Cooperation for Countering Terrorism 
India participates in a number of international and regional cooperative efforts to 
counter terrorism. India is a member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF) is 
remarkable and participated in other UN forums on counterterrorism in 2015.301 
Additionally, with the increase in terror activities regionally and internationally, India’s 
NIA has taken the regional lead in dialogue with the United States in the GCTF on 
foreign fighters and best practices to counter such threats in the future. Similarly, 
Bangladesh and other counties in the region continuously work to counter cross-border 
terrorism by strengthening bilateral cooperation in border management and the field of 
security, under the supervision of the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation 
(SAARC).302 However, the high increase in illegal immigrants and the rise of terrorism in 
Assam underscores India’s need to revise immigration policies and counterterrorism 
strategies to prevent crimes, terrorism, and extremist activities in the future.  
B. BAHAMAS  
The strategic location of the Bahamas just 185 miles from the United States in the 
Caribbean paves a migration pathway to the United States. Bahamas also faces its own 
challenges with illegal and undocumented immigrants, who have had created many 
security implications in the country. The principal migration problem that this island 
nation faces is from Haitians, who cannot immigrate legally but who come to Bahamas in 
great numbers, anyway. This section focuses on the rise of Haitian immigration on the 
Bahamas and its effects on national security.  
1. Historical Background of Haitian Immigration  
The historical identification of both the Bahamas and Haiti with immigration goes 
back many centuries. Conversely, the “geographical proximity of these countries has 
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been a source of conflict and tension, but also … mutual benefits.”303 Dawn I. Marshal 
points out that the Bahamians and Haitians interact mainly based on the trade from the 
1950s to the 1960; specifically, the “schooner trade of Haiti and the Out Island trade of 
the Bahamas” continued until tourism became important to the Bahamas in the late 19th 
century.304  
 
Figure 9.  Map of Bahamas.305 
Economic links and trade have increased the interest between the islands 
throughout the years; thus, many Haitian immigrants became established in the Bahamian 
Archipelago and on the island of Abaco.306 According to Darren A. Henfield, “Many 
farm laborers from the northwestern province were recruited to work on a large-scale 
farming in the Bahamas islands in 1957,” which resulted in increasing numbers of 
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immigrants, 10,000 to 20,000 from 1957 to 1969.307 As a result of the trade relationship 
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, subsequent waves of immigrants “including some 
of the Haitian educated classes began to migrate to the Bahamas for better employment” 
opportunities.308  
Apart from the economic migration, many other factors have contributed to the 
Haitian people’s desire to migrate to the Bahamas and other countries. Specifically, 
political instability and natural disasters in Haiti have forced more Haitians to flee to 
neighboring countries. Haiti endures “complex political strife, successive coups d’état, 
authoritarian governments and international interventions that have left” an ineffective 
political mechanism to address population needs.309 For example, as Henfield points out, 
“The end of the despotic Duvalier regime only intensified the efforts of Haitians to leave 
their native land in search of a better life for fear that the military now in charge of the 
country would intensify the abusive treatment.”310 Additionally, political gridlock among 
President Jean Bertrand Aristide and his opponents have also increased the pressure on its 
population to flee to the United States and the Bahamas.311 Most importantly, Haiti’s 
political and economic problems fuel both criminal and political violence, which have 
also contributed to the mass exodus of Haitians from their home.312  
Natural disasters, on the other hand, batter Haiti with more economic devastation 
and triggers immigration. For example, “when the earthquake hit the capital city of Port-
au-Prince and other parts of Haiti,” the country’s infrastructure collapsed, many died or 
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became displaced.313 The cost of rebuilding Haiti after the disaster reached $14 billion.314 
The country could not recover from the disaster because of government corruption and an 
inability to secure people’s basic needs during the post disaster period.315 Such 
vulnerabilities of living and security forced Haitians to migrate to the neighboring 
counties of the Bahamas and the United States. 
According to available statistics, by 2007, the government estimated the Haitian 
population in the Bahamas was roughly 75,000, “which is 25 percent of the Bahamian 
population.”316 However, in 2013, the IOM report of the Bahamas indicated that 
“between 20,000 and 50,000 undocumented Haitians lived in the islands of the 
Bahamas.”317 The increasing number of immigrants from Haiti poses many security 
threats in the Bahamas, especially to the country’s social, political, and economic 
institutions.  
2. Causes and Effects on National Security 
Legally, no Haitian can naturalize in the Bahamas because of the grant of 
permanent citizenship to all Haitians in Haiti’s constitution.318 As such, all Haitian 
migration to the Bahamas is illegal—including successive-generation immigrants. This 
more or less permanent illegal status confronts Haitians in the Bahamas with limited 
options for legitimate employment and, thus, raises the likelihood that Haitian migrants 
will engage in crime or worse.319 This section discusses the security threats that Haitian 
migration poses in the Bahamas, in particular, the economic, socio-cultural, and political 
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threats; human trafficking, drug trafficking, and other related crimes; and the rise of 
terrorism and ISIS links because of Haitian immigration. 
a. Economic and Socio-Cultural Threats   
In most places, unskilled workers (Haitian immigrants) have been more attractive 
than native Bahamians because firms can hire undocumented workers for less pay.320 As 
Erica Wells points out, “Haitian migrants are a source of cheap, reliable motivated labor, 
particular in the agricultural sector.”321 However, according to statistics, 11.2 percent of 
the Haitian community (10,728 people) suffers from a higher rate of unemployment than 
non-Haitian nationals.322 In other words, non-Haitian nationals earn more (4.2 percent of 
143,668 persons) than Hatian nationals living in the Bahamas.323  
Further, the influx of Haitian migrants puts a strain on such primary state services 
as education and health care. For example, according to the Department of Statistics, 
42 percent of Haitian nationals have failed to obtain a high-school education and thus 
have poor English language ability; a lower level of educational attainment, 
unemployment, and poverty form major economic threats to Bahamians today.324  
The official language of the Bahamas is English whereas Haitians speak French 
and Creole. Language, obviously, separates the two ethnic groups, which makes it easy to 
identify Haiti as different from the Bahamas. The disproportionate increase in the size of 
the Haitian community can make the nation feel threatened. For example, according to 
the Department of Statistics, the number of births has increased from an average of 7.2 to 
13.7 per Haitian woman (1970 to 2010).325 As such, an anti-migration, anti-Haitian 
discourse may always highlight the differences as viewed by nationalist Bahamians and 
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result in political violations due to structural discrimination and marginalization.326 In 
other words, cultural disparity due to Haitian immigration may have a negative impact 
that may lead to social uprisings in the country. As Henfield identifies, Haitian 
immigrants in the Bahamas pose three challenges: the “ingenuity of the illegal 
immigrants in staying under cover, the connivance of the Bahamian employers who 
welcomed workers who toiled hard for low wages, and the sentiments of Bahamian black 
liberals.”327 As such, these similarities may continue to encourage the nomadic activities 
of Haitians in the Bahamas. 
b. Political Threats 
As the UN Caribbean Development and Cooperation Committee identifies, “The 
large number of Haitians pose a threat to the ethnic and cultural homogeneity with which 
Bahamians perceived their country.”328 In other words, it is claimed that the Haitian 
migrants are rife with illiteracy, promoting crimes and other illegal activities. On the 
other hand, the Bahamas national security strategy concern two aspects of Haitian 
immigration. First, Haitian immigrants are aggressive and pose threats to the Bahamian 
culture. Second, the Bahamians believe that Haitians are a politically motivated people 
who might become a political threat to the country.329 As Henfield points out, due to the 
lack of political efforts by the government to prevent illegal immigration from Haiti, the 
people of the Bahamas believe that Haitians will take over their country with minimum 
effort.330  
Even though Bahamians have not experienced any terrorist activities, terrorist acts 
could take place on any of the islands that form the Bahamas. After “Al Qaeda’s attacks 
on the American homeland in 2001, security issues become even more critical when one 
                                                 
326 Fielding et al., “The Stigma of Being Haitian in the Bahamas,” 46–48.  
327 Henfield, “Making the National Security Council ‘Better in the Bahamas,’” 50. 
328 Ibid. 
329 Wells, “Heavy Haitian Burden.” 
330 Henfield, “Making the National Security Council ‘Better in the Bahamas,’” 43. 
 63 
considers the possible use of Caribbean maritime domain to attack the United States.”331 
For example, “an airliner hijacked after departure from an airport” in the Bahamas could 
reach South Florida in little time.332 Similarly, terrorists could “sabotage or seize control 
of a cruise ship after the vessel” passes the maritime boundary of the Bahamas and use it 
to attack the United States.333 As such, the government of the Bahamas must address not 
only the internal security aspects of the country but regional security as well.334  
c. Criminal Activities 
Human trafficking, the second-most profitable crime in the world, has been 
growing due to illegal immigration to the Bahamas in recent years. The Bahamas is a hub 
for human trafficking “from the Caribbean region, Central and South America due to its 
geographical location, its close proximity to the United States and coastal borders.”335 
Criminals and migrant smugglers use the Bahamas as a “major transit country to enter the 
United States”; however, smugglers have dropped most victims in the Bahamas rather 
than transporting them to the United States, which ultimately makes them vulnerable to 
trafficking and irregular entry to the country.336 As the report notes, passengers must pay 
more than $5,000 to the smugglers for transportation to the United States through the 
Bahamas.337 Most of them have been identified as migrants of Haiti, China, Jamaica, and 
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the Philippines.338 By contrast, the scale of trafficking is difficult to calculate because 
many details are unavailable and access to government surveys is limited.339  
At present, the Bahamas has not achieved a minimum standard to address the 
existing trafficking issue; however, as Michel Lohmuller points out, the government of 
the Bahamas received $2.75 million from the U.S. government “to enhance the 
capabilities of the Royal Bahamas Police Force to support drug demand reduction,” 
especially to enhance the capabilities of the institution of combating trafficking.340 
However, due to a lack of policies and strategies to counter transnational crimes, the 
Bahamas has become a potential hub for criminal activities that leads to an increase in 
other crimes like drug trafficking, and homicide in the country.  
Apart from human trafficking due to illegal immigration, drug trafficking and 
homicide are peaking in present-day Bahamas. According to the Nassau Guardian, “With 
over 700 islands spread across thousands of miles of water, the Bahamian coastal line 
provides innumerable opportunities to smuggle drugs, weapons and humans.”341 For 
example, in 2012, “345 pounds of cocaine worth $2.5 million [was] found at North West 
Cay, off Great Inagua.”342 Similarly, not only the Bahamian territorial waters but also the 
airspace of the Bahamas is used for drug transportation. In 2012, the Bahamas was 
recognized as “a major drug transit and a major illicit drug producing nation by the 
United States.”343 As a police report noted, police arrested a trafficker with “50 pounds of 
cocaine at the Lynden Pindling International Airport” in the Bahamas; as a result, 
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Customs and Border Protection personnel have continued to crack down on smugglers to 
prevent such crimes.344  
Severe failures of security and justice institutions have taken place in the 
Bahamas; illegal immigration and other crime rates have increased since 2001.345 
According to available statistics, the rate more than doubled from 14.3 murders per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2007 to 37 per 100,000 in 2011.346 As the Bahamas country 
profile highlights, the country experiences more than twice the number of annually 
recorded homicides, which include immigrants and Bahamians.347 Moreover, illicit fire 
arms transportation in the Bahamas due to illegal immigration pose many challenges to 
law enforcement agencies. Further, the country’s transit points have been in demand for 
the transnational arms trade because of its attractive geographical features; thus, the 
illegal arms trade contributed to number of homicides committed by firearms by 74 
percent in 2011.348 Therefore, the Bahamians perceive that the country “must press 
forward in the fight to combat illegal immigrants” as well as trafficking of humans, drugs 
and illicit weapons to minimize the crime rates in the country.349  
3. Measures Taken by the Government of Bahamas 
The subjects of illegal immigration, the increase in crime rates, and securitization 
are sensitive issues in the Bahamas. Moreover, an increase in population, the rise in crime 
rates, and the cost of detention facilities and deportation are major concerns of the 
government of the Bahamas and the people of the country. Some islands in the Bahamas 
have been a nexus of increased immigration flow and increased crimes rates.350 As such, 
the policies and strategies of the Bahamas focus mainly on combating irregular 
immigration and preventing crimes in the country.  
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a. Immigration Policies and Act 
Comprehensive immigration policies are important for preventing the illegal flow 
of immigrants and absorbing economic immigrants into the country. The Bahamas’ 
immigration policy is based on the 1928 Immigrants Act and its amendments together 
with the immigration rules made under the Act of 1939.351 Further, “the Immigration Act 
of 1967 includes provisions on entry, residence, transit, and the exit of migrants.”352 
However, tourists and foreigners can enter and exit the Bahamas with less formality and 
can prolong their stay with the approval of the government of the Bahamas.353 Moreover, 
policies applying to permanent residents and economic migrants are also included under 
immigration rules. For example, permanent residency status includes the right to work 
with an annual permit obtained from the government; in addition, this permit facilitates 
ownership of Bahamian land as a permanent resident, which requires only registration 
and not a land permit.354 
Similarly, the Bahamas Immigration Act granted migrants economic permanent 
residency while maintaining flexible immigration policies to make it easy for economic 
migrants to live and work in the Bahamas.355 However, to minimize illegal imigration, 
the government of the Bahamas imposed the following criteria: the migrant applicant 
must have no criminal record and must purchase property valued at $500,000 or more or 
have a beneficial interest in a business that supports the labor employment of the 
Bahamas.356  
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Nevertheless, due to the influx of immigrants, some immediate actions have been 
undertaken by the government of the Bahamas to prevent illegal immigration. According 
to Bahamas Weekly, people who do not have the legal status to work in the Bahamas or 
plan to apply for a work permit will “be refused and the applicant will be arrested, 
charged and deported.”357 As the article notes, all amended policies are to minimize the 
criminality associated with immigration, safeguard the borders, and protect Bahamians.  
b. Legal Policy and Institutional Framework for Combating Trafficking in 
Persons  
The government of the Bahamas has ratified the following acts and legal policies 
proposed by the United Nations: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish 
Trafficking in Persons, especially Women and Children; the United Nations Convention 
against Transitional Organized Crime; and the Convention on the Elimination of all 
forms of Discrimination against Women by the International Labor Organization.358 In 
1993, the government of the Bahamas even agreed to the 1951 Refugee Convention and 
its 1967 Protocol. However, so far, there is no “framework to implement the convention;” 
therefore, the Bahamas’ responses to these issues are ad-hoc and provide limited access 
to jurisdiction.359  
Human trafficking legislation, on the other hand, “protect[s] individuals from 
inhuman and degrading treatment (Art.17) and prohibit[s] slavery, labor forcing and 
forced transportation of people (Art.18)” from its constitution.360 The Bahamas ratified 
the protocols under the UN’s Trafficking in Persons (Prevention and Suppression) act 
that accepts the definition of trafficking and criminal offence in the Trafficking Act of 
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2007.361 Accordingly, the anti-trafficking legislation defines trafficking as the “unlawful 
withholding of identification papers, transportation of a person for the purpose of 
exploitation, including commercial sexual exploitation, forced labor, practices similar to 
slavery, and the illicit removal of organs.”362 Moreover, the government of the Bahamas 
relies on prevention, suppression, and punishment of traffickers under the legal 
framework of combatting human trafficking.363 Many attempts have been made by the 
government of the Bahamas to implement policies to prevent trafficking; however, these 
attempts merely reflect the country’s needs for a comprehensive border security unit to 
cover a larger area of trafficking sites on the islands. 
The Bahamas has continued to combat drugs and counter drug-related crimes due 
to illegal immigration within and outside the country. Further, the Bahamas became the 
first country to ratify the UN drug convention of 1988.364 Bahamian and American anti-
drug institutions and officials work very closely in the maritime and the air domains to 
combat drug trafficking. Bahamas has also continued to strengthen its judiciary system 
with the assistance of the U.S. government especially to “reduce the delay in the 
prosecution of criminals, and drug cases pending in the courts.”365 Furthermore, the 
United States and the Bahamas signed a bilateral treaty for maritime counternarcotic 
cooperation in May 1996 to minimize drug trafficking and crimes related to immigration 
within the country and the region.366 Still, considering the Bahamas’ restrictions on 
illegal immigrants and the crimes committed, the Bahamas must revise and introduce 
new policies to prevent the illegal flow of immigrants and minimize such crimes 
committed by them in the future.  
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c. Counterterrorism Strategy 
Although the Bahamas has not experienced any terrorist attacks, the Bahamians 
are leaders in combating terrorism, especially coordinating with the regional and the 
private sectors.367 At present, the Bahamas holds the Vice Chair of the Inter-American 
committee against Terrorism. As Bahamas Local.com points out, the Bahamas’ security 
strategy includes “mutual and effective information sharing, knowledge and experience 
through joint coordinated action to improve and implement measures to prevent 
terrorism.”368 Additionally, the country has passed measures to enhance the role of the 
UN system in countering terrorism.  
C. ANALYSIS 
India and the Bahamas have faced many challenges due to an influx of 
immigrants. In the Indian context, the migration and refugee phenomenon with 
Bangladesh has roots so deep that the problem cannot be solved overnight. The situation 
also shows that unless the sending country cooperates, “the problem of illegal migration 
cannot be effectively solved.”369 On the other hand, to minimize immigration and crime, 
some tough measures by India and Bangladesh should also be considered. For example, 
border fencing has become one of the major issues for both countries, which need a very 
high security alert along the border. A large number of border security forces have been 
deployed along the Indian–Bangladeshi border; however, limited resources, large gaps, 
and no fences fail to stop the infiltration effectively. Besides those tangible measures, it 
requires scrutinizing the security mechanism and the religious commitment in the 
political framework because the nation’s attitude and corrupt border security often 
support transnational crimes such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, and cross-border 
terrorism, especially in the Assam region in India.  
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Terrorism and extremism in India, on the other hand, have haunted Indian policy-
makers since independence. Underground terrorism and extremism operating in India has 
raised serious concern; the Indian experience in combating insurgency and terrorism 
requires a more coherent counterterrorism policy because conducting illegal activities and 
terrorism is not the motive of all immigrants.  
The issue of migration must also be judged from the human angle by both 
countries because not every migrant poses a threat to national security.370 The 
introduction of a work-permit system based on economic requirements will help secure 
an efficient work force for the country. For example, the Bahamas’ newly introduced 
policy is a good start for integrating economic immigrants to the labor market. Such 
immigrants would not have political rights or the right to acquire property. The advantage 
of this system, backed by the law, would be its ability to identify a large number of illegal 
immigrants and turn them into productive economic workers.  
The crime rates in the Bahamas reflect the state’s need for effective policies to 
address irregular immigration. The Bahamas needs a proper monitoring system through 
border control management and the homeland security department to control irregular 
immigrant movements, which also prevent the trafficking of drugs and humans. 
Similarly, information sharing with other countries is essential for cracking down on the 
flow and the route of smuggling and trafficking rings. Further, a monitoring system 
through border control should strengthen regional cooperation to combat human and drug 
trafficking in both India and the Bahamas, within the states and regions, and beyond.  
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IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 In post-conflict Sri Lanka, many refugees from Tamil Nadu and Tamils 
from Western countries are returning. Absorbing economic immigrants and preventing 
illegal immigration is a burning issue for Sri Lanka. As such, this chapter analyzes 
policies and security concepts of Sri Lanka as well as the two comparison cases, India 
and Bahamas.  It derives recommendations to apply in Sri Lanka, especially in the form 
of immigration laws, policies, and border security management, which include domestic 
and international measures to stop illegal flow of immigrants. Finally, the chapter puts 
forward counterterrorism concepts and strategies, including domestic and international 
coordination, to prevent acts of terrorism and extremism and criminal activities in Sri 
Lanka.  
A. IMMIGRATION LAWS, POLICIES, AND BORDER SECURITY 
MANAGEMENT  
Any strategy to deal with illegal immigration needs two essential elements: 
measures to prevent the flow of illegal immigrants and counter-measures after 
infiltration.371 Moreover, vast open borders with large-scale logistic requirements to 
maintain its forces and many illegal infiltrations due to gaps in the security system have 
put more pressure on border security forces in these countries. To address this challenge, 
initial steps must be taken to identify illegal immigrants because of the large number of 
undocumented immigrants residing in Sri Lanka without proper identification. As such, 
the first stage should identify inland undocumented immigrants; the next stage should 
calculate the flow of illegal immigration; and the final stage will restrict their movement.  
1. Domestic Control Measures 
Illegal immigration has now become a domestic policy issue because illegal 
immigrants pose many social, political, and economic threats to receiving states. The 
immigration issue continues to grow, and the country must adopt some measures to 
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absorb economic immigrants while preventing illegal immigrants from entering the 
country.  
The introduction of a work-permit system based on the state’s economy will 
synchronize the flow of economic migrants and differentiate undocumented, unskilled 
immigrants from skilled immigrants.372 At present, Sri Lanka does not issue work 
permits for economic immigrants; however, the government of Sri Lanka has introduced 
immigration policies to prevent illegal immigration and allow legal entry for immigrants 
through a working visa system.373 The aim of a work-visa system is to create more job 
opportunities and at the same time accommodate highly skilled economic immigrants.374 
However, the work-visa system in Sri Lanka is often associated with more unskilled than 
skilled immigrants, and the system does not create any job opportunities or improve 
economic conditions in the country.375  
India’s work-permit scheme, based on skilled labor, has effectively controlled the 
illegal immigrant flow into the county.376 The Indian work-permit system is effective and 
ensures efficiency of skilled economic immigrants because the system guarantees that 
only trained people come in and jobs have limited duration.377 Further, a work-permit 
system can monitor and be reviewed within the organization and suspend or repatriate 
any worker under performativity.378 The work-permit system in India not only controls 
immigration but also absorbs skilled laborers and uplifts the country’s economy.  
Like India, the Bahamas also employs a work-permit system. The Bahamian 
system is similar to India’s, but in terms of immigration policy, it is completely 
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nationalistic.379 In other words, according to the new policy, “no foreign immigrants may 
be offered a job that a skilled Bahamian is qualified to do.”380 Similarly, a newly 
introduced policy on illegal immigrants (November 1, 2014) augments the work-permit 
system in the country and specifies “every non-Bahamian living in the country has to 
have a passport of their nationality with proof of their status to live and work in the 
Bahamas.”381  
Adopting an immigration policy similar to that of India and the Bahamas with a 
work-permit system would facilitate absorbing skilled labor and minimizing unwanted 
immigration. As such, Sri Lanka must incorporate a work-permit system into the country 
to better account for skilled immigrants and prevent unskilled labor into the country—
especially when signing the ETCA with India will become another impending economic 
issue in terms of immigration.382 
The introduction of a photo identity link to personal information and a biometric 
fingerprinting program would distinguish legal and illegal immigrants.383 For Sri Lanka, 
identity management is vital for preventing human smuggling, trafficking, and cross-
border terrorism.384 As such, large-scale migration around the world requires a wide 
computer-based identification system for citizens and immigrants, especially for workers 
and temporary immigrants to distinguish legal from illegal immigrants in the country.385 
Most countries use photo identity cards to identify their citizens. Similarly, Sri Lanka 
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introduced photo identity cards in 1972 for its citizen and permanent residents.386 
However, in post-conflict Sri Lanka, the national identity card has now become an issue 
in the North and East provinces because many people either lost or damaged their identity 
cards during the war.387 Above all, many Tamil Nadu refugees and asylum-seekers face 
difficulties upon arrival because of they lack evidence to prove their citizenship in Sri 
Lanka.388  
India has also introduced an identity card system to identify its citizens and 
permanent residents. However, to identify illegal immigrants, India has introduced a 
“voluntary registration with designated authorities” to encourage illegal immigrants to 
register and apply for asylum, work permits, or permission to stay and work for certain 
durations with some monitory allowances.389 After the detection process is completed, 
such immigrants are issued an “Aadhaar card” based on a unique identification number 
for better identification.390 So far, India has managed to identify 10 million migrants, 
collect biometric information under Aadhaar, ensure the security of citizens, and 
minimize the illegal flow of immigrants.391  
The Bahamas’ new policy for a national identity card included a national 
insurance number, birth certificate data, a passport number, and biometrics linked to 
personal details to handle illegal immigration.392 Further, according to the Bahamas’ 
immigration minister, non-nationals living in the Bahamas must prove their identity to 
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work and stay in the Bahamas.393 Additionally, in the case of stateless persons, the 
government of the Bahamas provides an identity card connected to biometrics to 
distinguish between legal and illegal immigrants.394  
Most developed countries have the capacity to identify their citizens with photo 
identity cards connected to personal information in one or more databases. Such a system 
greatly helps to identify people within Sri Lanka. The integration of an identity card 
system with personal information and biometric fingerprints will enhance the border 
control mechanism, prevent cases of trafficking and smuggling, and provide a more 
transparent process at borders to protect from irregular immigrants. 
Reliable border-security management system. The integrity of borders is a 
problem for a country because ineffective control management eases illegal entry and 
creates various obstacles to legal entry.395 Sri Lanka’s borders allow greater illegal 
infiltration because the island nation affords numerous safe landing points. As such, the 
country at present has experienced drug trafficking, human smuggling, and cross-border 
terrorism. The Immigrants and Emigrants Act No. 20 of 1948 “provided comprehensive 
regulation of the flow of persons to and from the country.”396 In other words, the 1948 
law describes the eligibility to enter the country and categories of people who are not 
eligible to enter the country.397 However, border management and security officials must 
carefully analyze illegal immigrant flow because limited exits allow passengers to arrive 
and depart from Sri Lanka, namely the Bandaranaike International Airport in Katunayake 
and the Mattala International Airport in Hambanthota; however, Colombo and 
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Trincomalee harbors are rarely used by travelers.398 Limited exit and entry points restrict 
access to legal immigration but allow access to illegal infiltration because of the large 
number of illegal landing sites. Open borders around the island facilitate illegal 
immigration, trafficking, smuggling, and cross-border terrorism.399  
In India, the land border with Bangladesh is vital for illegal infiltration even 
though India deploys a large border security force there.400 The border-control issue in 
Assam-Bangladesh first came after the partition of East Pakistan and West Pakistan in 
1971, which resulted in millions of illegal immigrants fleeing to India.401 So far, limited 
resources and large gaps in border fences have failed to effectively prevent illegal 
infiltration.402 However, with the increase of illegal immigrants from Bangladesh, the 
government of India has improved its border-security management system with new 
technology, such as infrared sensors and cameras, to detect people before they reach 
shore along the border.403 Nevertheless, besides those tangible measures—physical troop 
deployment and high-tech monitoring systems—border control requires proper political 
commitment. Notably, some political parties in the Assam state often support and 
encourage illegal immigration to retain political power.404 As such, with political 
leverage, corrupt border security often supports illegal immigrant crossings, which 
increase transitional crimes such as human trafficking, drug trafficking, and cross-border 
terrorism, especially in the Assam region in India.405  
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The immigration issues in the Bahamas resemble those of India. In the Bahamas, 
the issue reflects the need for a proper monitoring system through border control 
management to prevent illegal immigrants from the Caribbean Ocean because so many 
islands—700 islands, of which only 30 are inhabited—require surveillance. As the 
Minister of Immigration and Emigration points out, the Bahamas border-control system is 
augmented with biometrics and the INTERPOL system to check immigrants using the 
best technological practices available.406 Such efforts have subsequently prevented the 
trafficking of drugs and humans. Similarly, information sharing with other countries is 
essential for cracking down on the flow and routes of smuggling and trafficking rings.407 
Sri Lanka must maintain the integrity of its border-security management system, 
which must be augmented with increased resources for prevention including additional 
staff to handle improved technology—sensors, infrared scopes, and data systems—and a 
proper training system for border control and security officers, which includes strategies 
that make border control and security management systems operate proficiently.  
Installation of proper scanning systems in Airports and seaports. Sri Lanka has 
become a transit hub for all criminal activities because of a lack of proper scanning 
systems. Most issues—especially drug trafficking, money laundering, and terrorist 
movement—happen at entry and exit points on the coast and at airports in Sri Lanka.408 
The lack of a screening system at airports allows immigrants to move freely. Such lapses 
in strategically important places in Sri Lanka have increased the number of illegal 
immigrants crossing into the country to transport drugs and support other criminal 
activities.  
India and the Bahamas, on the other hand, have these security systems in place. 
India has installed the most advanced scanning system—including the “millimeter-wave 
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technology based full body scanners”409—in airports and seaports in the wake of 
successful attacks carried out by terrorists in major cities of India. The use of new 
technologies expedites the inspection process and improves law enforcement. As such, a 
proper scanning system with advanced technological devices is critical for identifying 
such traffickers and terrorists at entry and exit points. Hence, such a system must be 
incorporated into Sri Lankan border control, and the laws of the country need to be 
revised accordingly to exact maximum punishment for such offenses as trafficking, 
smuggling, and terrorism.  
2. International Coordination 
International coordination to prevent illegal immigration is especially important in 
bi-lateral agreements on information sharing. Additionally, multilateral partnerships 
among sending, receiving, and transit countries need to be established for the border 
management system. As such, this section discusses international coordination for 
information sharing; preventive measure agreements in trafficking, smuggling, and cross-
border terrorism; and other agreements in the immigration and border-control process. 
International coordination with neighboring countries and the county of origin of 
immigrants. Collecting data about human smuggling, drug trafficking, and trans-border 
and international terrorism is important for cracking down on illegal immigrants and 
terrorists.410 Many incidents in Sri Lanka have occurred because of a lack of critical 
information shared by bordering countries—especially information on diaspora activities 
and immigrants, the link between diaspora and Tamil Nadu criminal activities and other 
extremist activities. As a result, criminal activities have increased inside the country. For 
example, immigrants cross the coast illegally from India because of the specific illegal 
landing points at Mannar, Jaffna and Negambo. According to Sri Lanka’s police reports, 
the police have intercepted 89 vessels engaged in human smuggling since 2009, but very 
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few boats have been captured so far because of a lack of information sharing between 
India and Sri Lanka.
411 
 
Cooperation and coordination with neighboring countries is critical for preventing 
the illegal flow of men and materials. As Demetrios G. Papademetriou and Elizabeth 
Collett explain, “International cooperation on border management over the last decade 
has occurred largely on ad-hoc basis, through bilateral talk opportunities and deal making 
or rules that place obligation on third parties.”412 In other words, a lack of agreements 
and bi-lateral treaties among sending and receiving states and third-party involvement has 
complicated the immigration issue.413 Greater cooperation must be established between 
India and Sri Lanka. So far, however, the influx of asylum seekers and refugees 
immigrating from India reflects an absence of coordination between India and Sri Lanka.  
The India–Bangladesh and Bahamas–Haiti multilateral agreements on 
immigration laws and border control systems have failed to prevent illegal flows of men 
and material.414 However, in order to minimize illegal immigrants, India contributed 
financial assistance to Bangladesh to improve living standards415 but made no bilateral 
agreements to minimize immigration. In short, India created a population who belongs 
neither here nor there. As such, the Indian context mirrors the need for bilateral 
coordination with Bangladesh to prevent illegal infiltration, trafficking, smuggling, and 
cross-border terrorism.416 
On the other hand, the Bahamas and Haiti, along with other Caribbean countries, 
have bilateral agreements that have decreased crime rates in the region. The U.S.–
Bahamas agreement—recalling the 1974 International Convention for Safety of Life at 
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Sea—to prevent illegal immigration, illicit trafficking in narcotic and smuggling of 
migrants by sea and air has yielded a more effective counter measure in border-security 
management.417 As such, international coordination and arrangements must be put in 
place in Sri Lanka to enhance cooperation between states on immigration management, 
especially for information sharing on individuals such as biometrics, global travel based 
on individual profiles, and agreements such as a multilateral partnership among 
immigrant receiving, sending, and transit countries for better coordination.418  
B. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS  
Maggie Ibrahim observes, “The securitization of migration discourse has been 
cemented by the fear that migrants may be supporters for insurgencies,” and a potential 
driving force for social uprisings, extremism, and terrorist activities.419 So far, Sri Lanka 
has passed many laws and implemented security reforms to combat terrorism. The 
Prevention of Terrorism Act, enacted in 1982 as a wartime measure, gives security forces 
“powers to search, arrest and detain individuals,”420 thus restricting movement of the 
LTTE cells operating in Sri Lanka. However, lifting the “emergency law” in the recent 
past has increased insurgency and other civil movements in the North and the East. 
Further, apart from the lack of reforms and strategies, a lack of coordination among 
domestic institutions has been seen in Sri Lanka.  
As discussed in previous chapters, similar patterns of terrorist movements can be 
observed in India and Western countries. The counterterrorism strategies of India have 
focused on countering the financing of terrorism and border security management to 
prevent and disrupt terrorism in the country. Even though India has taken many steps to 
prevent terrorism and extremism, such movements still haunt policy makers and make the 
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country’s situation worse because of a lack of political commitment while political 
parties seek short-term wins to retain power in the Assam region.421  
1. Domestic Measures 
Sri Lanka must have proper domestic mechanisms to counter terrorist activities. 
State institutions also have an important role to play besides policy and legislative 
changes when countering terrorism. Therefore, this section discusses domestic measures 
of countering terrorism such as legislation changes, command and control, coordination 
functions, intelligence services, and a strategic force to react to any emergency. 
Legislative changes in the field of criminal prosecution. The lack of legislative 
changes in prosecution has increased many terrorist, extremist, and criminal activities in 
the country. The LTTE has its own criminal network operating among the Tamil diaspora 
and Tamil Nadu refugees. For example, the GTF, the TGTE, and the BTF conduct their 
illegal activities from India and many Western countries.422  
After experiencing terrorist attacks, India ratified two laws, namely the “National 
Investigation Agency … act that seeks to establish a new police organization to 
investigate acts of terrorism,” and Unlawful Activities (prevention) Act to prevent acts of 
terrorism.423 India has introduced laws specifically to maintain civil liberties while taking 
measures to prevent act of terrorism in the country.424 On the other hand, the NIA act 
applies to terrorists and their activities, providing especially for harsh punishments—
from five years to life imprisonment or a death sentence—for a person accused of act of 
terrorism.425  
Sri Lanka must focus on new legal measures and amendments for existing 
measures such as anti-terrorism and anti-criminal acts in the legislation to tighten the 
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legal gap, especially in banning extremist religious groups that advocate terrorism, 
computer sabotage, use of explosives, assaults on air and sea traffic, and crimes against 
humanity. After lifting the “emergency law,” no laws have been passed against terrorism. 
As such, Sri Lanka must develop an investigative act of terrorism or an unlawful 
activities legislative agenda as terrorist prevention to ensure the safety of citizens. 
Establishment of a proper command-and-control structure. At present, the lack of 
coordination among institutions, such as the coast guard, law enforcement, and the 
intelligence community, has been observed because of their different command 
functions.426 For example, the Sri Lankan Coast Guard, established in 2009, denies 
maritime access to organized crime such as human smuggling and trafficking, which 
augments the blue-water domain of the Sri Lankan Navy.427 However, the Coast Guard 
and the Navy fail to cooperate in terms of refugee handling, criminals, and information 
sharing about terrorists because of a lack of security strategy and unified command 
between the Sri Lanka Navy and the Coast Guard.428 For example, as Global 
Security.Org points out, “One critical drawback had been the absence of right equipment 
and the waste of funds on useless arms, amunution and equipment.”429 In summary, a 
lack of security strategy under a unified command resulted in the duplication of the task 
and a waste of resources in terms of operation planning and executing.430 As such, Sri 
Lankan law enforcement and other supporting elements should function under one 
unified command in an emergency situation as they do in Western countries.  
India employs a different concept. India’s Department of Border security 
Management and other border protection forces—the Indo-Tibetan border police, Indo-
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Bhutan, and Border Security Forces—have been placed under the coordination of the 
Ministry of Home Affairs for an easy command and control function. India recognizes 
that divided responsibilities and tasks under different commands in a crisis do not achieve 
effective results.431  
Sri Lanka must establish one unified command system to delegate power and 
avoid duplication of tasks. A strategic institution like the Department of Homeland 
Security must be established in Si Lanka to coordinate all elements (law enforcement 
forces, border control officials, and intelligence community) to react effectively during 
any emergency.432 
Establishment of a centralized intelligence service. The success of national 
security relies not only on the information gathered but also on the timely and effective 
dissemination of that information to all relevant agencies and policymakers.433 
Ultimately, this process seems to be lacking in Sri Lanka because different intelligence 
constituencies operate under a different organization. For example, the National 
Intelligence Bureau and the Directorate of Military Intelligence and Police intelligence 
operate separately, which has resulted in a duplication of critical information, and wasted 
money and effort in strategic intelligence planning.434  
The Indian intelligence system operates under the Joint Intelligence Committee 
(JIC) and functions under the Cabinet Secretariat.435 Every other intelligence community, 
such as the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) or the Intelligence Bureau, function 
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directly under the JIC for better control, oversight, and effectiveness.436 As Aman Bhagat 
highlights, ‘The JIC is responsible for coordinating and analyzing intelligence activities 
between RAW, the Intelligence Bureau, and the Defence Intelligence Agency.”437 This 
“intra-agency cooperation system in India effectively contributes to achieving its national 
security strategy.438  
This discussion reflects the government of Sri Lanka’s need to restructure the 
intelligence community to achieve the highest possible level of transparency and 
effectiveness. Therefore, intelligence control—direction and oversight—must be ensured 
by the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of the government.439 Further, internal 
arrangements within the intelligence organizations (military/civil) or external 
mechanisms (both domestic and international levels) are intended to achieve the highest 
level of control, oversight, and effectiveness to support the institutional security 
mechanism in order to prevent, detect, deny, and respond to any kind of threat posed by 
the illegal flow of men and matériel. 
A proper law enforcement force integrated with highly mobile teams to react to 
any crisis is crucial for disrupting, delaying, and destroying any terrorist movement in the 
country. After lifting the Emergency Act 1 of 1983440 in Sri Lanka, most troops have 
been withdrawn from Colombo, Jaffna, and many places in the North and the East. A 
lack of security forces deploying to these strategically important locations has resulted in 
many isolated incidents such as re-emergence of LTTE cells, social uprisings, and 
demonstrations on the Jaffna peninsula.441  
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India has quick reaction teams (QRTs) operating under the Central Industrial Task 
Force to react to any emergency.442 These teams have shown remarkable results in crisis 
prevention situations, especially in airports, in countering terrorism.443 For example, on 
November 26, 2008, during the Mumbai attack, the QRT of commandos effectively 
handle the situation, especially during the hostage situation and terrorist attacks.444 As 
such, in the recent past, India formed another rapid reaction team to protect its maritime 
domain. The Maritime Rapid Reaction Force’s primary task is to conduct naval special 
operations including countering the nuclear environment in asymmetric warfare 
operations.445 India is now in the process of acquiring new equipment for these teams and 
providing better training to achieve speedy reaction. 
Special counterterrorism forces or QRTs can give the government a significant 
advantage over terrorists and other criminal groups.446 Therefore, Sri Lanka must have 
professionally trained, well-equipped quick reaction teams to deploy in strategic locations 
to react to any emergency. The forces primarily deter various types of terrorist 
operations, especially by disrupting, delaying and destroying terrorist movement and 
criminal activities. However, these teams need to be placed directly under a strategic 
command like the Joint Operational Command (JOC) for better coordination with the 
Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Immigration, Border Control and 
Security Management, the office of the Chief of Defence Staff, and the Ministry of 
Defence.  
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2. International and Regional Measures  
Foreign agreements and collaboration in countering terrorism have been sporadic 
at best.447 Individual countries have political, economic and diplomatic interests that lead 
to greater cooperation with other countries. Of the cases examined here, India, Sri Lanka, 
and the Bahamas all reflect that need for bi-lateral discussions with neighbors and other 
countries. For example, the Sri Lankan ethnic conflict has been linked to Tamil Nadu and 
the Tamil diasporas. Similar patterns can also be observed in India and the Bahamas. 
Most criminal activities, including financing and terrorist activities, are linked to overseas 
criminal and terror networks.  
Foreign collaboration is at least helpful and may be critical to the success of any 
counterterrorism planning.448 All collaboration plans, for example, can benefit from 
shared research and intelligence, mutual extradition agreements, and aid, for instance, in 
the forms of training of special operation platoons and necessary equipment for special 
teams.449 On the other hand, these agreements are mutually beneficial in terms of 
counter-financing of terrorism and prevention of terrorism support.450 Therefore, the 
government of Sri Lanka must address the following areas to tighten domestic security 
gaps while enhancing the economic sector with the collaboration of regional and 
international partners:  
a. Introducing new multilateral and by-lateral agreements on immigration  
  laws and a border control system to prevent human, weapon, and drug 
  trafficking as well as trans-border terrorism. 
b. Signing new agreements and collecting data  about human smuggling, drug 
  trafficking, trans-border and international terrorism. 
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c. Creating foreign agreements and reviewing existing agreements with 
  India and Western countries to ban the LTTE, prevent the financing 
  and supporting of terrorism by the Tamil diaspora. 
d. Signing a Memorandum of Understanding on military, intelligence 
operations, and training for special operations with regional and other 
foreign partners to enhance security. 
C. BOTTOM LINE 
Security has become an important issue in sovereign states from which citizens 
seek protection against internal and external threats. Sound security concepts have made 
great states achieve remarkable success in engaging their adversaries.451 Every country 
must have a proper domestic organization to react to any emergency. In the Sri Lankan 
context, “it is obvious that Sri Lanka still capitalizing on the old Westminster 
arrangement, as their strategies to face eventualities.”452 As such, it is about time Sri 
Lanka focuses on a coordinated homeland security concept to meet eventualities 
including the re-emergence of the LTTE due to Tamil Nadu refugees and the Tamil 
diaspora, the advent of such extremism as Muslim religious fundamentalism, the 
rekindling of ethnic conflicts and sectarian violence, organized crime, and smuggling. 
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V. CONCLUSION  
Like many countries in a postwar situation, Sri Lanka faces potential threats from 
various sources. Different forms of crime, terrorism, and ideological threats are a few 
examples. Because these threats challenge national security, the government must counter 
these threats, ensure the safety of the nation, and continue with peace and prosperity. As 
such, the government must have a robust system of combined information sharing, 
foreign policy, economic affairs, defense, and international law to mitigate social, 
political, and economic threats posed by illegal immigrants. Hence, the government of Sri 
Lanka must focus on a coordinated homeland security concept to meet eventualities. 
The concept of “homeland security” came into effect after the 9/11 attack in the 
United States.453 The mission of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is to 
prevent terrorist attacks on U.S. soil and to avoid an event as catastrophic as 9/11 in the 
future.454 As such, the proposed homeland security concept for Sri Lanka combines 
efforts to ensure a safe homeland for citizens and to secure it against terrorism and other 
hazards.455 Accordingly, Sri Lanka’s national security strategy must be redesigned, and 
policy must address critical issues that affect the country’s defense, foreign policy, as 
well as economic and internal matters.456 
A. A NEW HOMELAND SECURITY CONCEPT FOR SRI LANKA  
Sri Lanka needs a well-coordinated homeland security strategy to counter threats 
like criminal activities, terrorism, religious extremism, and sectarian violence linked to 
immigration.  
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1. Fundamental Aim for Homeland Security Strategy  
C. Wickramasinghe proposes reforms in the security sector and introduces a new 
organization for Sri Lanka’s homeland security (see Figure 10).457  
 
Figure 10.  National Security Model for Sri Lanka.458 
According to his proposed model, the executive branch of Sri Lanka’s 
government exercises control over the Presidential Task Force (PTF) with the legislative 
and judiciary branches.459 The PTF is headed by the secretary and responsible to the 
president and the parliament. As Wickramasinghe describes, “The main concept of the 
homeland security, which are prevention, protection, response, and minimize disruption 
and restore the function of critical infrastructure is applied to this model as well.”460 The 
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model that Wickramasinghe describes is the foundation of the new homeland security 
model introduce in this chapter. As such, in the new model, the secretary of homeland 
security falls immediately under the executive, legislative, and judiciary branches of the 
government of Sri Lanka for better democratic control, oversight, and effectiveness.461  
The proposed homeland security model focuses on the security threats imposed 
by illegal immigrants, such as the re-emergence of the LTTE due to Tamil Nadu refugees 
and the Tamil diaspora; the advent of such extremism such as Muslim religious 
fundamentalism; the rekindling of ethnic separation and sectarian violence; organized 
crime; and smuggling. Most importantly, the model targets the links between the criminal 
and terrorist networks of the LTTE.  
2. Effective Coordination and Response 
The model introduced here is primarily focused on preventing, detecting, denying, 
and responding to security threats and the flow of illegal men and materials into and 
through Sri Lanka. Prevention includes stopping individuals from engaging in terrorist, 
criminal, and other extremist activities.462 Detection consists of identifying such 
activities and organizations that may pose threats to national security.463 Denial, on the 
other hand, includes restricting the movements, means, and opportunities to carry out 
terrorist and criminal activities. Finally, a rapid and comprehensive response to their 
activities in an organized manner mitigates activities and their effects.464 These four 
elements are discussed in the following paragraphs. 
a. Prevention  
Some immigrants pose national security challenges including the threat of 
terrorism, violent extremism, and criminal activities. To counter these threats effectively, 
awareness must exist among citizens, law enforcement agencies, and the government of 
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Sri Lanka.465 This obligates the government to share knowledge with citizens about the 
nature of threats to foster a deeper understanding of particular actions such as law 
enforcement (knowledge of policies, laws, and acts), public safety, and awareness.466 
Government agencies need to better inform citizens, so citizens can help mitigate 
threats.467 Similarly, other government departments—such as the SLBFE, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of Border Security and Management, and 
the Ministry of Defence—should have supporting programs that directly or indirectly 
help to mitigate threats and help the government and society organize effective domestic 
mechanisms to respond to such threats.468  
Further, apart from domestic threat-prevention programs, the government of Sri 
Lanka must coordinate its efforts, especially in intelligence coordination with 
international alliances, to prevent financing and support of terrorism and other criminal 
activities469 
b. Detection 
Acquiring information early is necessary to counter threats posed by illegal 
immigrants. Detection requires strong intelligence capacities and capabilities and sharing 
of strategic-level information with domestic and international partners.470 All intelligence 
agencies must be placed under the strategic command of the proposed DHS establishment 
for better functioning and controlling of intelligence community.471 Laws and policies 
must be enacted for the democratic functioning of the intelligence community in order to 
achieve democratic control oversight and effectiveness.472 Border Security Management, 
the Department of Immigration and Emigration, the Chief of Defence Staff, and the 
                                                 
465 Wickramasinghe, “Reforming Security Sector to Inculcate Professionalism,” 146.  
466 Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy, 26–27. 
467 Wickramasinghe, “Reforming Security Sector to Inculcate Professionalism,” 146.  
468 Ibid., 146.  
469 Ibid.  
470 Wills et al., Measuring the Effectiveness of Border Security, 12.  
471 Matei, “Intelligence Reform in New Democracies: Factors Supporting or Arresting Progress.” 606. 
472 Ibid., 607.  
 93 
Department of Bureau and Intelligence must function under the DHS for better 
coordination and smoother functioning of all institutions.  
c. Denial 
The government of Sri Lanka should focus on denying access to all illegal 
immigrants, terrorists, and other criminals.473 Further, the government must deny the 
means and opportunities to carry out activities and the flow of illegal persons as well as 
materials and to protect Sri Lanka and its citizens.474 The proper functions of intelligence 
and law enforcement (policies, acts, and laws), action (use of force), prosecution, and 
domestic and international cooperation would mitigate vulnerabilities and prevent all 
criminal activities.475 However, the end state is to deny all access through Sri Lanka’s 
finance, critical infrastructure, and critical transportation systems.476 Additionally, 
managing borders with neighboring countries and enhancing border and supply-chain 
security to combat terrorism with an electronic information system and risk management 
are important for denying all access.477 As such, proper coordination with Border 
Security Management, the intelligence community, and Special Operation Teams must be 
organized and placed under the operational command of the proposed DHS. Further, 
these agencies need to coordinate with the international intelligence community, 
international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) and neighboring countries to deny 
persons and materials access to the country.478  
d. Response 
The immediate response to any emergency often involves a well-coordinated plan 
between law enforcement agencies and other organizations.479 However, the response to 
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any threat must include both domestic and international considerations.480 The domestic 
plan should be integrated with law enforcement agencies, QRTs, intelligence agencies, 
and all levels of government authority. The international plan should encompass a 
regional and global action plan to counter terrorism, criminal networks, and the financing 
of terrorism.481 The response to terrorists and other criminal activities abroad should be 
coordinated with other countries through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of 
Defence, and DHS.482 Further, the proposed DHS has the primary responsibility for the 
overall coordination of responding to domestic terrorism and criminal activities through 
the office of the Chief of Staff, the Joint Operational Command Center (including all 
three military forces, the police, and QRTs), the Department of Immigration and 
Emigration, and Border Security Management—supported by public affairs as well as 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and INGOs. In order to ensure the safety and 
legality of actions, Justice Emergency Teams (groups of legal counselors) need to be 
attached to law enforcement to provide coordinated legal advice and support.483  
3. Conceptual Model Designed for Sri Lanka 
These details are outcomes of the collective actions of all DHS components, 
which include law enforcement, the intelligence community, other government 
departments, agencies, international partners, citizens, INGOs, and NGOs. All actions 
require an intelligence network system, which includes collecting information on the flow 
of men and materials, sharing that information, and acting on the information in a timely 
manner to prevent, detect, deny, and respond to threats against Sri Lanka effectively.484 
Figure 11 provides further understanding of the new model for Sri Lanka’s homeland 
security: 
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Figure 11.  Conceptual Model for Homeland Security.485 
A summary of the tasks assigned for each department and law enforcement 
appears in Table 1 for clear identification. As such, the model comprises all elements, 
such as the office of the CDS, the JOC, Border Security Management, the intelligence 
community, law enforcement, and other departments, placed under the command of the 






                                                 











































Table 1.   Summary of Tasks Performed by the Departments, Law Enforcement, 
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The strategic concern of Sri Lanka in the present context is how best the county 
can meet challenges posed by immigrants, terrorists, and other criminals internally and 
externally. On the other hand, the strategic aim of homeland security has now become a 
priority and a challenge as to how such missions can best be achieved through 
coordinated plans and effective practices simultaneously.486 Further, emergency 
management, resource mobilization, and counterterrorism response in homeland security 
require interagency, inter-governmental, private sector, and NGO coordination to achieve 
success.487  
B. FINAL THOUGHTS 
At present, migration is a nodal point in the internal security of Sri Lanka. As 
such, the government of Sri Lanka has taken measures to minimize undocumented 
immigration and securitization measures to prevent insurgency movements in the future, 
especially by adopting strong immigration policies, border security, and counterterrorism 
strategies. However, controlling borders is not an easy task for any sovereign state. 
Manning seaports and airports to deter illegal immigrants, illegal activities, and the rise 
of terrorism and extremism is a major challenge faced by the government of Sri Lanka in 
the present.  
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Sri Lanka has become a vital place for many foreign counterparts because of its 
strategic location in the Indian Ocean. The strategic location of Sri Lanka has been 
manipulated by various groups to carry out their activities because as a classic transit 
point, it has access to sea and air routes to many destinations in the world. The strategic 
location of the country is an attractive factor for immigrants. Not only its strategic 
location but also certain gaps in its laws—its immigration and border control system—
have resulted in an increase in immigrants and illegal activities in recent years. The lack 
of immigration policies and counterterrorism strategies has resulted in an increase in 
immigrants and their impact on national security. 
The re-emergence of the LTTE can develop as an action of political or military 
support to the existing Tamil ideology of forming a separate state in Sri Lanka. The re-
emergence of LTTE terrorism in Sri Lanka with the support of the Tamil diaspora in the 
long term cannot be ignored. According to Ibrahim, “Immigrant communities established 
in foreign countries are believed to frequently support insurgencies in their 
homelands.”488 At present, the Tamil diaspora with the umbrella organizations of the 
PTGTE, the GTF, and the BTF has tried to generate political pressure in Sri Lanka by 
claiming a separate Eelam state. On the other hand, the Eastern province may pose 
another potential threat of Islamic fundamentalism because of immigration. 
National security raises a debate about how policy and counterterrorism strategy 
feeds into Sri Lanka, while highlighting the possible struggle over political, social, 
economic, and cultural criteria to satisfy the people of the country. The term 
“securitization” of migration, on the other hand, implies the further categorization of 
immigration because of the economic and foreign policy of the country. However, 
considering the ongoing threats posed by immigrants that favor the potential for 
increasing the securitization of migration, which includes reform of the comprehensive 
policies, the practice of immigration control, and effectively coordinated counterterrorism 
strategies to monitor immigrants can enhance the national security of Sri Lanka.  
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